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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY  
 
„The test of responsibility(of directors), therefore, should be, not the certainty of 
wisdom in others, but the possession of ordinary knowledge; and by showing 
that the error of the agent is of so gross a kind that a man of common sense, and 
ordinary attention, would not have fallen into it. The rule which fixes 
responsibility, because men of unerring sagacity are supposed to exist, and 
would have been found by the principal, appears to us essentially erroneous.‟1 
 
The so called business judgment rule (hereinafter referred to as ―the BJR or the rule‖) that 
serves to protect directors from liability for negative consequences of honest, reasonable 
business decisions that went wrong, was developed by the American judiciary in the early 
19
th
 Century.
2
 Percy v. Millaudon, a Louisiana Supreme Court decision quoted above, 
articulated what is now referred to as the BJR.
3
 This case provides the earliest expression of 
the American BJR.
4
 Delaware courts subsequently issued a series of cases formulating the 
BJR as a presumption.
5
 Although the earliest expression of the rule was provided by a 
Louisiana court, the dissertation will focus on the Delaware case law formulation of the rule.
6
 
 
The essence of the BJR is that judges should not second guess directors‘ decisions if certain 
elements of the BJR are fulfilled.
7
 Courts are required to exercise caution when dealing with 
claims brought by either stakeholders or shareholders against directors who have made bona 
                                                          
1
 Percy v Millaudon (1829) 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829) 77-78. 
2
 Durckheim L Does South Africa Need a Statutory Business Judgment Rule (published LLM thesis, University 
of Pretoria, 2012) 5 (hereafter referred to as Durckheim L (2012)). 
3
 McEachin T 'Theriot v. Bourg: The Demise of the Business Judgment Rule in Louisiana?‘ (1998) 59 Louisiana 
Law Review 385. 
4
 Keller B ‗Australia‘s Proposed Statutory Business Judgment Rule: A Reversal of a Rising Standard in 
Corporate Governance‘ (1999/2000) 4 Deakin Law Review 126.   
5
 Aronson v Lewis 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
6
 Leach J The Correct Understanding of the Business Judgment Rule in Section 74(6) of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008: Avoiding the American Mistakes (published LLM thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014) 14 (hereafter 
referred to as Leach J (2014)).  
7
 Giraldo C & Bogota C ‗Factors Governing the Application of the Business Judgment Rule: An Empirical 
Study of the US, UK, Australia and the EU‘ available at 
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/vniver/cont/111/cnt/cnt5.pdf (accessed on 10 February 2016). 
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fide, also referred to as good faith, business decisions.
8
 In order to be protected by the BJR 
and for it to act as a safe harbour, the court will determine whether certain requirements have 
been met before applying the rule.
9
 The Delaware courts formulated the BJR as a 
presumption and in order for directors to be protected by the rule they must have made an 
informed business decision, in good faith and in the honest belief that the decision will be in 
the best interest of the company.
10
 As will be discussed later, this formulation of the rule is 
referred to as the traditional BJR.  
 
In addition to the aforementioned formulation, another formulation was provided by the 
American Law Institute (hereafter referred to as the ―ALI formulation‖).11 Initially there had 
been difficulties codifying the ALI version of the rule but later it was successfully codified in 
paragraph 4.01(c) of the ALI Corporate Governance Project.
12
 This formulation requires a 
director to ensure that he has no personal interest in the matter, he is reasonably informed of 
the matter prior to making the decision and he rationally believes the decision will be in the 
best interest of the company.
13
 If the director complies with the aforementioned requirements, 
the director will be considered to have acted in good faith.
14
 
 
Directors owe fiduciary duties to the company and in instances where they breach one or 
more of these duties they can incur personal liability.
15
 The rule thus emerged because of the 
need to protect directors and it serves as a safe harbour for those individuals who made a 
decision in conformity with the aforementioned requirements.
16
 In commercial terms the rule 
bestows economic freedoms and freedom of entrepreneurship to directors guided, in any case, 
by ―the best interest of the company‖.17 The most commonly cited reasons for the existence 
of the rule are that it promotes risk taking, encourages competent persons to serve as 
                                                          
8
 Durckheim L (2012) 20. 
9
 Giraldo C & Bogota C ‗Factors Governing the Application of the Business Judgment Rule: An Empirical 
Study of the US, UK, Australia and the EU‘ available at 
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/vniver/cont/111/cnt/cnt5.pdf  (accessed on 10 February 2016). 
10
 Aronson v Lewis 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  
11
 Durckheim L (2012) 21. 
12
 Durckheim L (2012) 21. 
13
 American Law Institute, ALI Corporate Governance Project (1994). 
14
 American Law Institute, ALI Corporate Governance Project (1994).  
15
 Hughes J, Pendleton G & Toren J ‗SHAREHOLDER DERAVITIVE LITIGATION: A Primer for Insurance 
Coverage Counsel‘ available at http://media.lockelord.com/files/uploads/documents/17908572_1.pdf(accessed 
on 23 June 2016).  
16
 DeMott D ‗Directors' Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule: American Precedents and Australian 
Choices „available at http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol4/iss2/ (accessed on 10 February 2016). 
17
 DeMott D ‗Directors' Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule: American Precedents and Australian 
Choices „available at http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol4/iss2/ (accessed on 10 February 2016). 
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directors, prevents judicial second-guessing and promotes judicial efficiency. It further 
provides directors with sufficient freedom to manage the company and it ensures that the 
interest of shareholders and those of directors are balanced.
18
 
 
Initially the Delaware formulation of the BJR was straightforward but over the course of time 
it was given a myriad of formulations which caused some courts and commentators to stray 
from the simple conception of the BJR.
19
 The straightforward version of the rule is referred to 
as the traditional business judgment rule.
20
 This traditional version of the rule simply requires 
the directors to have made an informed decision, in good faith and in the honest belief that it 
would be in the best interest of the company.
21
 However, when Delaware courts were of the 
opinion that shareholders needed more protection in certain transactions, the modern BJR 
was created.
22
 The modern BJR consists of the Entire Fairness Doctrine (hereafter referred to 
as the ―EFD‖), the Unocal standard and the Revlon standard.23 In instances where 
shareholders have managed to prove that directors have failed to act in an informed, good 
faith and honest manner or contrary to the best interests of the company, Delaware courts 
would apply the EFD which then places the burden on directors to prove that the transaction 
was entirely fair to the company and its stockholders.
24
 In instances where the matter at hand 
deals with a hostile takeover and shareholders are alleging that the directors failed to act in 
accordance with their duties, Delaware courts would opt for the application of the Unocal 
standard.
25
 Furthermore, if a case before the Delaware court concerns defences taken by 
directors to prevent a hostile bidder from succeeding in his bid for the sale and control of the 
corporation, the court will apply the Revlon standard.
26
 The EFD is the most onerous of them 
all and it is often difficult for directors to satisfy thereby prohibiting them from receiving the 
                                                          
18
 Rosenburg D ‗Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule‘ (2007) 32 Journal of Corporation Law 
301. 
19
 Kennedy-Good S& Coetzee L ‗The Business Judgment Rule (Part 1)‘ (2006) 27 Obiter 73. 
20
 Aronson S, Tomkins S & Hassi T et al ‗Shareholder Derivative Actions: From Cradle to Grave‘ available at 
https://www.mondaq.com/pdf/clients/87654.pdf(accessed on 19 November 2016).  
21
 Aronson v Lewis 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
22
 La Croix K ‗A Look at the Modern Business Judgment Rule‘ available at 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2015/08/articles/director-and-officer-liability/a-look-at-the-modern-business-
judgement-rule/(accessed on 04 August 2016). 
23
 Siegel M ‗The Illusion of Enhanced Review of Board Actions‘ (2013) 15 University of Pennsylvania Journal 
of Business Law 600. 
24
 Haims J & Beha J ‗n re MFW Shareholders Litigation: Controlling Shareholder in Going-Private Transaction 
May Gain the Benefit of the Business Judgment Rule‘ available at https://media2.mofo.com/documents/130816-
in-the-courts.pdf (accessed 19 August 2016). 
25
 Bainbridge S ‗The Geography of Revlon-Land‘(2013) 81 Fordham Law Review 3294. 
26
 Bainbridge S ‗Lost in Revlon-land: An acquisition by a public corporation should not trigger Revlon‘ 
available at http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/05/lost-in-revlon-land-an-
acquisition-by-a-public-corporation-should-not-trigger-revlon.html (accessed on 19 August 2016). 
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protection of the BJR.
27
 The effect of the modern BJR is that the courts will apply a 
heightened standard of judicial review prior to applying the traditional BJR.
28
 Although the 
modern BJR seems clear in Delaware, other states have been uncertain as to whether they 
should adopt the modern version of the rule as they are confused as to the scope and 
application of the rule.
29
 
 
Regardless of the uncertainties and problems attached to the formulation of the BJR as a 
result of Delaware‘s expansion of the rule, various countries continued to incorporate the rule 
into their law, South Africa being one of these countries.
30
 The rule is thus relatively new in 
South Africa as it was only incorporated into South African law in 2011 by way of the 
section 76(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereafter referred to as the ―New Act‖).31 
Under the Act, the BJR will have a practical effect of countering or alleviating the new less 
subjective and more rigorous duty of directors to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence 
in the performance of their duties.
32
 
 
In terms of section 76(4)(a), if a director has taken reasonably diligent steps to become 
informed about the matter, had no personal financial interest in the subject matter of the 
decision, disclosed any personal financial interest s/he might have in the subject matter of the 
decision and believed that the decision would be in the best interest of the company, the 
director is presumed to have exercised his power in the best interest of the company and with 
reasonable care, skill and diligence.
33
 If the aforementioned has been satisfied, the BJR would 
protect the director from incurring any personal liability for the harm suffered by the 
company.
34
 
 
                                                          
27
 Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allan, No. CIV.A. 16301, 1998 WL 892631 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1998) 11. 
28
 La Croix K ‗A Look at the Modern Business Judgment Rule‘ available at 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2015/08/articles/director-and-officer-liability/a-look-at-the-modern-business-
judgement-rule/(accessed on 04 August 2016). 
29
 Du Plessis J ‗Open Sea or Safe Harbour? American, Australian and South African Business Judgment Rules 
Compares: Part 1‘(2011) 32 The Company Lawyer 342-347. 
30
 Cassim FHI, Cassim MF & Cassim R et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2013) ch 11 (hereafter referred 
to as Cassim et al (2013)). 
31
 Leach J (2014) 20. 
32
 Cassim FHI et al  (2013) ch 11. 
33
 Cassim FHI et al (2013) ch 11. 
34
 Cassim FHI et al (2013) ch 11. 
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The concern with the rule in South Africa is that there has only been one case which has very 
briefly dealt with the BJR and its elements.
35
 As a result thereof, there is still uncertainty as to 
how South African courts will apply the rule especially as it lacks good faith as a requirement 
in section 76(4) of the New Act. There is further uncertainty as to whether South Africa 
should follow Delaware by adopting the modern BJR which includes the Entire Fairness 
Doctrine, the Unocal standard and the Revlon standard.  
 
1.2  RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The main purpose of this study is to provide clarity as to whether South African courts should 
adopt the modern BJR to apply to certain transactions. The study will unpack and address 
whether the modern BJR should be applied to mergers and acquisitions as well as insolvent 
trading transactions. Recommendations will be made, indicating how clarity and certainty on 
the aforementioned issues could be provided in South Africa. This study will outline the 
development of the BJR as well as the problems associated with the rule. More clarity on the 
research objectives is provided below. 
 
The study will be guided by the following objectives: 
 
 To give an overview of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule 
 To discuss the different formulations of the BJR in America 
 To give an overview of the different interpretations of the BJR 
 To analyse the application of the BJR in various contexts such as mergers and 
acquisitions as well as insolvent trading  
 To analyse the BJR as it currently stands in South Africa 
 To consider the directors‘ duties and liabilities  
 To critically discuss the failure to include ‗good faith‘ as a requirement in section 
76(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
 To critically discuss whether a modified business judgment rule and heightened 
scrutiny will be needed in South Africa, for certain transactions, which include 
mergers & acquisitions as well as insolvent trading 
 
                                                          
35
 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC). 
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1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The study will be insightful and make a considerable contribution to the application of BJR 
by South African courts. It will assist with ensuring that there is certainty surrounding the 
application and scope of the BJR in order to prevent the uncertainties prevalent in America, 
as a result of Delaware‘s expansion of the rule. With the BJR being relatively new in South 
Africa it is essential to address these issues as soon as possible and to provide the readers 
with insight into the topic.  
 
This research is further interesting because the angle differs from that of previous 
commentators in the sense that the focus is not on whether it was wise to adopt the rule into 
South African law, the focus is rather on how this rule can be applied in various contexts and 
the limitations to the application and scope of the rule in certain transactions. Furthermore, 
the study will demystify the uncertainties surrounding the scope of the BJR in order to ensure 
that clarity is provided in South Africa. 
 
Essentially the findings might assist South African courts of law as well as the legal 
representatives by clearly highlighting the contexts within which the BJR may be applied to 
protect directors who make risk entailed decisions. 
 
1.4 LIMITATIONS TO THE STUDY 
 
For the purpose of this study, only the application of the BJR in certain transactions will be 
studied. The question as to whether it was wise to incorporate the rule into South African law 
will not be addressed.  
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Given the purpose of the study, an analytical research methodology is required. Various 
articles will be relied upon in order to discuss the purpose of the BJR. When analysing the 
certain transactions within which the rule could be applied, reference will be made to judicial 
decisions as well as articles. The Companies Act 71 of 2008 as well as case law will be used 
to critically discuss the formulation and application of the BJR in South Africa whilst articles, 
foreign legislation and case law will be used to provide a detailed discussion on the 
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formulation and application of the rule in America, with emphasis on Delaware. International 
and South African focused textbooks, year books and journal articles will also be considered 
when analysing the various aspects of the research and subject matter.  
 
Furthermore, two terms play an essential role later in this dissertation, namely mergers and 
acquisitions as well as insolvent trading. Merger refers to the process of the joining together 
of two companies.
36
 When companies merge they combine their resources into a single 
business and it results in the owners of the pre-merger companies having to share in the 
ownership of the merged business.
37
Acquisitions, also referred to as takeovers, involve a 
process whereby the acquirer, usually a bigger financially sound firm, purchases the target 
company which is considerably smaller.
38
 On the other hand, there are two definitions 
provided for insolvency. The first definition provides that if a company is unable to pay its 
debts as it becomes due, it could be declared insolvent.
39
 The second definition refers to the 
corporations‘ liabilities exceeding its assets.40 When a company falls within one of the 
aforementioned definitions of insolvent, directors could still trade in an attempt to improve 
the company‘s financial position and this in essence gives effect to the term ‗insolvent 
trading‘.41 
 
1.6 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
This thesis consists of five chapters. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This chapter serves as an introduction to the study. It consists of the problem statement, 
purpose of the study, significance of the study, research methodology and chapter outline. In 
essence, its purpose is to provide the readers will a clear overview of what the rest of the 
thesis will consist of.  
                                                          
36
 Coyle B Mergers and Acquisitions (2000) 2 (hereafter referred to as Coyle B (2000)). 
37
 Coyle B (2000) 2. 
38
 Malik M, Anuar M & Khan S et al ‗Mergers and Acquisitions: A Conceptual Review‘ (2014) 4 International 
Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting 521.  
39
 Fraudulent Transfers Act, Title 6, Delaware Code §§ 1302(a)-(b). 
40
 Fraudulent Transfers Act, Title 6, Delaware Code §§ 1302(a)-(b). 
41
 Boelter J ‗Fiduciary Duties and the Zone of Insolvency‘ available at 
http://www.navigant.com/~/media/WWW/Site/Insights/Disputes%20Investigations/Fiduciary_Duties_Zone_Inso
lvency.pdf(accessed on 15 August 2016). 
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Chapter 2: The Business Judgment Rule in Delaware 
 
This chapter will provide a detailed discussion into the history of the BJR in America, 
focusing on Delaware. This will include a discussion of the history, directors‘ duties and 
liabilities, formulations, interpretations and shortfalls of the BJR. 
 
Chapter 3: The Application of the BJR in Fundamental Transactions 
 
Chapter 3 will deal with application of the modern BJR to certain transactions, including 
mergers and acquisitions and insolvent trading. This will include discussions of mergers and 
acquisitions and insolvent trading as well as the Entire Fairness Doctrine, Unocal Standard 
and the Revlon Standard. 
 
Chapter 4: The Business Judgment Rule in South Africa 
 
This chapter will start off by analysing the history, competing views of the incorporation of 
the rule into SA law and the directors‘ duties and liabilities in South Africa. Thereafter, the 
formulation of the rule in section 76(4) and the differences between the Delaware and South 
African rule will be considered.  
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
In this chapter the conclusions are drawn based on the research conducted and obtained in 
this dissertation. Thereafter recommendations will be made as to how South African courts 
can deal with the failure to include good faith as a requirement in section 76(4). Further 
recommendations will be made as to whether South African courts should adopt the modern 
BJR in order to apply it to certain fundamental transactions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE DELAWARE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The term ‗business judgment rule‘ has been evolving and it has taken on fresh meanings in 
new and different situations.
42
 As a result thereof, there is a large amount of uncertainty 
surrounding the BJR which gives rise to much concern.
43
 In the past, academics and the 
judiciary have spent a large amount of time attempting to understand the underlying policy 
justifications, the correct theoretical formulation as well as the correct practical application of 
the BJR.
44
 What was designed to be a straightforward rule has now become a rule which 
academics and the judiciary are battling to understand.
45
 Today, this remains a problem as the 
uncertainty surrounding the rule continues and it raises many concerns as the BJR has been 
adopted in a number of other countries.
46
 The concern is whether the same issues which 
currently exist in Delaware regarding the BJR would arise in countries which have 
subsequently adopted the rule.
47
 Although there have been various attempts to answer the 
questions surrounding the application of the BJR, the answers do not resolve the lingering 
uncertainty attached to the BJR.
48
 
The State of Delaware (hereafter referred to as ‗Delaware‘) has been referred to as the 
corporate capital of the world and its courts have become the most preeminent venues in the 
United States for resolving corporate disputes.
49
 The corporate law rules adopted in 
Delaware, such as the BJR, are thus adopted and followed in the rest of the United States.
50
 
The BJR is a key concept in Delaware corporate law and the Delaware courts have been 
                                                          
42
 Duesenburg R ‗The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Suits: A View from the Inside‘ 
(1982) 60 Washington University Law Review 311. 
43
 Manning B ‗The Business Judgment Rule in Overview‘ (1984) 45 Ohio State Law Journal 617 (hereafter 
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developing and expanding the application of the rule.
51
 As previously mentioned, the 
expansion of the BJR is the cause of all the confusion attached to the rule.
52
 Based on the 
aforementioned it is necessary to focus on the history, developments as well as the problems 
surrounding the application of the Delaware BJR.  
For the purpose of this chapter it should be borne in mind that the term ―director‖ refers to 
disinterested directors. It is important to note that the term ‗disinterested directors‘ refers to 
directors who do not have a personal or financial interest in a matter concerning the 
corporation which is material and is likely to affect his judgment.
53
 
Prior to discussing the BJR it is necessary to analyse the directors‘ duties and liabilities as 
provided by Delaware corporation law. In doing so, it would become easier to understand the 
BJR and why it was developed. Thereafter the focus will shift to the history and purpose of 
the BJR as well as the most common formulation of the rule, application and problems 
surrounding the application of the rule.   
 
2.2 DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
 
The business and affairs of Delaware corporations are the responsibility of the board of 
directors and in fulfilling their responsibilities, they are given fiduciary duties as well as non-
fiduciary duties.
54
 These duties require the directors to act in the best interest of the 
corporation thereby protecting the interests of the stockholders.
55
 The non-fiduciary duties 
imposed on the directors are not a point of discussion in this chapter but the Delaware 
fiduciary duties will be critically discussed.  
 
Initially, directors were given two fiduciary duties, namely, the duty of loyalty and the duty 
of care.
56
 However, recently the Delaware Supreme Court has introduced the duty of good 
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faith as a fiduciary duty resulting in the existence of a triad of fiduciary duties.
57
 Other 
jurisdictions have started accepting the aforementioned triad of fiduciary duties.
58
 Although 
the duty of good faith plays an integral part in both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, 
the Delaware Supreme Court decided that good faith is an integral duty and thus needed to be 
dissected from the rest.
59
 It is necessary to analyse these duties in order to grasp a better 
understanding of the BJR.  
2.2.1 Duty of Loyalty 
In the case of Stone v Ritter the court concluded that the duty of loyalty should be defined as 
an obligation to act in good faith to advance the best interest of the corporation.
60
 According 
to the Delaware Supreme Court: 
‗where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby 
demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their 
duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith‘.61 
In making the aforementioned statement, the court went further and concluded that the duty 
to act in good faith is a condition of the fundamental duty of loyalty.
62
 In essence what this 
means is that a director cannot act loyally towards a corporation unless he acts in the good 
faith belief that his actions are in the corporation‘s best interests.63 The duty of loyalty 
requires directors to act in the best interest of the company instead of acting in their own 
interests.
64
 Directors should thus avoid engaging in transactions which would result in a 
conflict of interests.
65
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Transactions which involve conflict of interests are referred to as self-dealing transactions.
66
 
The concept is that directors focus on their own interests and in doing so they may not reach 
an agreement that is fair and beneficial to the company.
67
An example of a self-dealing 
transaction is when a director has a direct or indirect personal financial interest in a matter 
involving the corporation.
68
 In a situation like this a director is required to disclose the 
information to the board of directors but failure to do so would amount to a breach of his duty 
of loyalty.
69
Another instance which requires loyalty is when a corporate opportunity arises 
and a director is expected to make the opportunity available to the corporation before 
pursuing it for his own benefit.
70
 Failure to make the opportunity available to the corporation 
would result in a breach of the duty of loyalty.
71
 
2.2.2 Duty of Care  
In the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, the duty of care is considered to be 
a fiduciary duty.
72
 This is an important factor to note as it differs fundamentally from South 
Africa which considers the duty of care to be a non-fiduciary duty.
73
 
The duty of care sets a threshold for the way in which the board of directors is required to 
make decisions and perform their supervisory functions.
74
 The duty of care consists of three 
separate facets, namely, good faith, reasonable belief and reasonable care.
75
 Once again it is 
evident that good-faith is a requirement of the duty of care just as it is for the duty of loyalty. 
In dissecting the three facets mentioned above it is important to note that when a director is 
required to exercise good faith, he or she is required to be honest and to avoid any conflict of 
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interest when performing his duties.
76
 Reasonable belief deals with the substance of the 
director‘s business decision.77 Reasonable care on the other hand, is concerned with the 
procedural aspects of a director‘s decision-making as directors are required to be sufficiently 
informed prior to making a business decision.
78
 
The Delaware Supreme Court further articulated the duty of care in Smith v Van Gorkom by 
stating that it is a director‘s duty to exercise an informed business judgment.79 The duty thus 
requires directors to inform themselves prior to making a business decision, of all the 
information, which is reasonably available to them.
80
 Although the board is expected to be 
informed, it is not expected of them to be informed of every fact.
81
 Failure to make an 
informed business decision would result in a breach of the duty of care which in essence, 
would imply the real possibility of liability for negligence.
82
 The duty thus requires directors 
to be found liable in instances where the company suffers harm as a result of the director‘s 
failure to perform his or her duties.
83
 Case law thus illustrates that only when directors have 
made business decisions in accordance with the required standard of care, will they be 
shielded by the rule.
84
 
Having discussed the two duties which have traditionally been the only fiduciary duties 
imposed on directors, the recently added duty of good faith will be analysed.  
2.2.3 Duty of Good Faith 
The aforementioned makes it quite clear that good faith is interrelated with the duty of care 
and the duty of loyalty. The element of good faith can be implemented as a substitution for 
the definition of loyalty and it can be adopted as an element to assess the breach of the duty 
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of care.
85
 However, as a result of the Delaware Supreme Court‘s decisions to make good faith 
a separate fiduciary duty, it is necessary to analyse the importance of this duty.  
The existence of good faith as a separate duty arose in the decision of the Delaware Supreme 
Court in Cede & Co. Technicolor Inc.
86
 The matter dealt with application of the BJR to a 
decision of the board of directors to approve a merger.
87
 The court required the plaintiff to 
prove that the directors ‗breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary duty which is good 
faith, loyalty of due care‘.88 This was the first time a Delaware court referred to fiduciary 
duties as a triad of duties.
89
 
In defining good faith, Delaware courts have focused on the definition of bad faith.
90
 The 
decision of the Chancery Court in In Re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation 
provided further clarification on the duty of good faith.
91
 According to the court, directors 
will have breached their duty to act in good faith if they ‗consciously and intentionally 
disregarded their responsibilities by adopting a ‗we do not care about the risks‘ attitude 
concerning a material corporate decision‘.92 Directors thus intentionally disregard their 
responsibilities knowing that the corporation could potentially be harmed.
93
 Delaware courts 
have stated that the concept of bad faith refers to improper motives or personal gain as well 
as arbitrary actions or conscious disregard for the interests of the corporation including the 
rights of stockholders.
94
 
Having analysed the triad of fiduciary duties owed by directors to the corporation and its 
stockholders, it is necessary to consider the potential liability of directors should they breach 
one of the aforementioned duties. Questions such as who can institute claims and how they 
can institute their claims come to mind when thinking of director liability. 
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2.3 DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY  
One of the downfalls of being a corporate director is the exposure to financial liability which 
all directors potentially face.
95
 The Delaware Court of Chancery hears more than 200 cases a 
year, most of which involve director liability.
96
 As previously discussed, directors have 
fiduciary duties and they potentially face personal liability for damages arising from the 
breach of any of the fiduciary duties.
97
 It is essential to bear in mind that liability needs to be 
looked at from two perspectives, namely, when a company is solvent and when it is insolvent. 
The reason for this is that the persons who may institute the claims differ although the 
manner in which the claims can be instituted remains the same.
98
 
According to the court in Gheewalla, when a company is solvent the stockholders are the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation‘s growth and increased value.99 Stockholders have 
thus been given a right to bring claims against a director for an alleged breach of one of the 
aforementioned duties.
100
 The manner in which stockholders can bring such claims is referred 
to as derivative actions.
101
 It is important to note that stockholders do not have the right to 
directly sue the directors as they can only do so on behalf of the corporation.
102
 
                                                          
95
 Lajoux A ‗D&O Liability: A Downside of Being a Corporate Director‘ available at 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/23/do-liability-a-downside-of-being-a-corporate-director/(accessed 
on 23 June 2016).  
96
 Lajoux A ‗D&O Liability: A Downside of Being a Corporate Director‘ available at 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/23/do-liability-a-downside-of-being-a-corporate-director/ (accessed 
on 23 June 2016). 
97
 Hughes J, Pendleton G & Toren J ‗SHAREHOLDER DERAVITIVE LITIGATION: A Primer for Insurance 
Coverage Counsel‘ available at http://media.lockelord.com/files/uploads/documents/17908572_1.pdf(accessed 
on 23 June 2016).  
98
 Callison J ‗Why a Fiduciary Shift to Creditors of Insolvent Business Entities is Incorrect as a Matter of 
Theory and Practice‘ available at https://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/conferences/Twilight/CALLISON.PDF 
(accessed on 19 November 2016).  
99
 Programming Fund v Gheewalla 930 A.2d (Del. 2007) 92, 99. 
100
 Huebner M & McCullough H ‗The Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Troubled U.S Companies: Emerging 
Clarity‘ available at https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-
delaware+who+can+claim+from+directors+for+breach+of+fiduciary+duties&oq=delaware+who+can+clai
m+from+directors+for+breach+of+fiduciary+duties/(accessed on 23 June 2016).  
101
 Huebner M & McCullough H ‗The Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Troubled U.S Companies: Emerging 
Clarity‘ available at https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-
delaware+who+can+claim+from+directors+for+breach+of+fiduciary+duties&oq=delaware+who+can+clai
m+from+directors+for+breach+of+fiduciary+duties/(accessed on 23 June 2016). 
102
 Goldberg S ‗Fiduciary duties of a director of a Delaware corporation, the current standard‘ available at 
http://www.delawarellcblog.com/2009/10/fiduciary-duties-of-a-director-of-a-delaware-corporation-the-current-
standard/ (accessed on 23 June 2016). 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
The aforementioned differs slightly when a corporation has been declared insolvent.
103
 
Although a corporation is insolvent, directors are still expected to make important decisions 
in managing the corporation and thus still owe fiduciary duties to the corporation.
104
 
Although creditors may not directly sue the directors, they are entitled to institute a derivative 
action against the directors who breached their fiduciary duties.
105
 
The purpose of the derivative suit is to restore the damage suffered by the corporation as a 
result of the director‘s conduct.106 A derivative suit can be used for a variety of corporate 
traumas such as self-dealing, waste of corporate assets and misconduct on behalf of the 
directors.
107
 
Given the potential liability faced by directors, Delaware courts have created various 
defences which could be raised by directors should a derivative action be taken against 
them.
108
 These defences include indemnification, insurance, exculpation and the business 
judgment rule.
109
 However, for the purpose of this dissertation, the only defence which will 
be elaborated on is the BJR. The purpose of this dissertation is not to discuss indemnification, 
insurance and exculpation as this has been successfully done elsewhere.
110
 Having considered 
the duties and liabilities faced by the directors of a corporation it is necessary to begin the 
discussion with the vocal point of this dissertation which is the BJR.   
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2.4 THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
2.4.1 History 
Prior to the creation of the BJR, there had been a large number of publicised suits and threats 
thereof against directors.
111
 Corporate directors were thus referred to as ‗sitting ducks for 
shareholder and third party liability suits‘.112  The suits were instituted for different reasons 
such as negligence and bad judgment on the part of directors.
113
 However, most suits were 
based on the allegation that directors were acting in their own interest at the expense of the 
company and in doing so they breached their duty of loyalty.
114
 
By its nature the BJR is designed to achieve a compromise between the two competing 
values, namely, authority and liability.
115
 The authority element refers to the need to ensure 
that directors maintain their decisional powers, whereas liability indicates the importance of 
holding directors liable for business decisions.
116
 The liability element furthermore 
emphasises the need to prevent and correct inappropriate conduct of the directors.
117
 
In order to prevent directors from being exposed to personal liability the common law BJR 
was introduced.
118
 As mentioned in chapter 1, Percy v. Millaudon articulated what is now 
referred to as the BJR.
119
 Although the focus of this dissertation is on the Delaware BJR, it is 
necessary to refer to Percy v. Millaudon, as it provided the earliest expression of the BJR.
120
 
Other States, such as the State of Delaware, subsequently issued a series of cases which 
focused on the BJR and Delaware courts played a central role in developing the rule.
121
 
However, the Delaware case law formulation of the BJR has been widely entrenched into 
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most parts of the American corporate law jurisprudence.
122
 Delaware being referred to as the 
corporate capital is the reason for the aforementioned.
123
 
In Percy v Millaudon the court refused to hold the directors liable for losses suffered by the 
company resulting from the theft of funds by the bank‘s president and a cashier.124 In refusing 
to hold the directors liable the court relied on what is now referred to as the BJR.
125
 
According to the court,  
‗The only correct mode of ascertaining whether there was fault in an agent, is by 
enquiring whether he neglected the exercise of that diligence and care, which 
was necessary to a successful discharge of the duty imposed on him. There are 
many things which, in their management, require the utmost diligence, and most 
scrupulous attention. There are others, whether the duties imposed are presumed 
to call for nothing more than ordinary care and attention, and where the exercise 
of that degree suffices.‘126 
The aforementioned statement illustrates that in applying the rule, the court looked at whether 
anything has come to the directors‘ knowledge which could have made the directors‘ question 
the loyalty of the president and cashier.
127
 However, in instances where no suspicions were 
raised and the directors paid attention to the ordinary affairs of the corporation, it is sufficient 
to conclude that they have fulfilled their fiduciary duties.
128
 In other words, if the situation 
would have placed a prudent man on guard, a degree of care is required in order to avoid the 
inappropriate conduct of the president and cashier.
129
 When determining whether the director 
acted in a manner in which the prudent man would have acted, the court focuses on the 
possession of ordinary knowledge of the director, instead of focusing on the wisdom of third 
parties who are in the same position as the director in question.
130
 If the court finds that the 
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error of the director is an error which a man of common sense and ordinary attention would 
have avoided, the directors will incur personal liability for their negligence.
131
 In the Percy 
case the court found the directors‘ failure to detect the scheme of the bank‘s president and a 
cashier as an error in judgment.
132
 The court further held that a director cannot be held liable 
if the error he made was one which a prudent man would have made.
133
 
Delaware courts have acknowledged that the administration of a corporation involves making 
many risk entailed business decisions, not all of which will prove successful.
134
 Some 
business decisions run the risk of turning into disasters which would subsequently be 
detrimental to the company.
135
 Projects that cause the company to suffer a loss and the 
decision to grant loans which are never repaid are common examples of business decisions 
with an undesirable outcome. As discussed earlier in this chapter, directors have a triad of 
fiduciary duties, namely, the duty of loyalty, duty of care and the recently added duty of good 
faith and should these duties be breached, directors can incur personal liability.
136
 However, 
what happens when the board of directors comply with their duties in making a business 
decision but the decision turns out to be disastrous? This is exactly why prior to the 
establishment of the BJR, directors were referred to as ‗sitting ducks‘ for derivative 
actions.
137
 The moment the corporation is harmed, stockholders approach courts and rely on 
derivative actions, which could potentially cause directors to pay a large sum of money from 
their personal pockets.
138
 
Based on the aforementioned it is clear that the rule was developed in order to protect 
directors from incurring personal liability provided that they have acted in the required 
manner.
139
 The term ‗required manner‘ refers to the criteria provided by the courts for 
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determining whether the rule should apply to the situation at hand. The criteria require the 
decision to be a business decision, it must be an informed decision (duty of care), there 
should be an absence of a conflict of interests (duty of loyalty) and the decision should have a 
rational basis.
140
 The rule will be applicable regardless as to how controversial, unpopular or 
wrong the decision might turn out to be and directors will furthermore be protected if their 
conduct is in accordance with the aforementioned criteria.
141
 It is thus clear that corporate 
directors are provided with extensive protection against personal liability by the BJR.
142
 The 
criteria will be discussed in detail at a later stage, at this point it is just stated for purpose of 
clarity.  
Although the modern courts continue to insulate directors from liability for honest mistakes 
according to the above mentioned traditional rule, the Delaware courts began attaching a 
more expansive role to the BJR in the 1980s.
143
 Initially, the rule applied in instances where 
there are no procedural infirmities but Delaware courts went further by applying the rule in 
cases where procedural infirmities have been mitigated by a special committee, stockholder 
approval, or partial substantive review by the court.
144
 If the procedural infirmities were 
sufficiently muted by way of one of the aforementioned, the court would respect the 
directors‘ decision by applying the BJR.145 Therefore, what is now referred to as the ‗modern 
business judgment rule‘, is applied in various fundamental transactions such as takeovers and 
mergers.
146
 This aspect of the rule will however be elaborated on in Chapter 4 of the 
dissertation. 
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 2.5 COMMON FORMULATIONS OF THE RULE IN AMERICA   
There are two common formulations of the rule in America.
147
 These formulations include 
the American Law Institute (ALI) Version and the Delaware case law formulation.
148
 
2.5.1 ALI Version 
Initially the American Law Institute struggled to codify the BJR.
149
 However, the rule was 
later codified in paragraph 4.01(c) of the ALI Corporate Governance Project.
150
 Paragraph 
4.01(c) provides the following:  
‗A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfils the 
duty under this Section if the director or officer: 
(1) is not interested in the subject of the business judgment; 
 
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the 
extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under 
the circumstances; and 
 
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the 
corporation‘151 
 
The ALI version recognises the functional role of the BJR as it provides a test which courts 
will apply in order to determine whether a director should be held liable or not, for the harm 
suffered by the corporation.
152
 Stated differently, the aforementioned test will provide for 
liability or non-liability of directors based on the manner in which his business judgment was 
made.
153
 The test is centred on three aspects.
154
 The first aspect is that a director is financially 
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and personally disinterested in the business transaction.
155
 Secondly, the director needs to 
rationally believe that the decision is in the best interest of the corporation and thirdly, the 
director needs to ensure that he makes an informed business decision.
156
 
 
It is evident that paragraph (c)(1) relates to the fiduciary duty of loyalty in that a conflict of 
interest should be avoided.
157
 However, it is essential to pay attention to the difference 
between (c)(2) and (c)(3). To be more specific, it is important to look at the words 
‗reasonably‘ and ‗rationally‘ as they are often used interchangeably but in this instance the 
standards differ quite fundamentally.
158
 The reasonable standard is an objective test which 
requires a court to look at whether a third-party would have acted in the same manner as the 
director.
159
 In other words, it is an aspirational standard of conduct.
160
 The rationality test on 
the other hand, is a subjective test as the focus is placed on the ability of a director to use his 
power and judgment prior to making a final business decision.
161
 Rationality requires logical 
thinking to take place and as a result thereof, when directors are expected to exercise 
rationality, the manner in which this is done can take different forms.
162
 Therefore, unlike 
reasonableness, there are no uniform criteria used by Delaware courts to determine 
rationality.
163
 The rationality test is thus far less stringent in comparison to the reasonable test 
‗as it is easy to characterise a directors conduct as imprudent or unreasonable but it is very 
uncommon to characterise a directors‘ conduct as irrational‘.164 
                                                          
155
 Hopt K, Kanda H & Roe M et al (1998) 326. 
156
 Hopt K, Kanda H & Roe M et al (1998) 326. 
157
 Hearn C & Friend A ‗Feeling Conflicted? Identifying and Resolving Conflicts of Interests‘ available at 
https://m.acc.com/chapters/houst/upload/N2658084.pdf (accessed on 22 June 2016). 
158
 Veasey N ‗On Corporate Codification: A Historical Peek at the Model Business Corporation Act and the 
American Law Institute Principles Through the Delaware Lens‘ available at  
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1611&context=lcp (accessed on 29 June 2016). 
159
 Veasey N ‗On Corporate Codification: A Historical Peek at the Model Business Corporation Act and the 
American Law Institute Principles Through the Delaware Lens‘ available at  
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1611&context=lcp (accessed on 29 June 2016). 
160
 Veasey N ‗On Corporate Codification: A Historical Peek at the Model Business Corporation Act and the 
American Law Institute Principles Through the Delaware Lens‘ available at  
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1611&context=lcp (accessed on 29 June 2016). 
161
 Bainbridge S ‗The difference between reasonableness and rationality in corporate law‘ available at 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/09/the-difference-between-reasonableness-
and-rationality.html(accessed on 07 September 2016). 
162
 Bainbridge S ‗The difference between reasonableness and rationality in corporate law‘ available at 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/09/the-difference-between-reasonableness-
and-rationality.html(accessed on 07 September 2016). 
163
 Bainbridge S ‗The difference between reasonableness and rationality in corporate law‘ available at 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/09/the-difference-between-reasonableness-
and-rationality.html(accessed on 07 September 2016). 
164
 Eisenberg M ‗The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law‘ (1993) 
62 Fordham Law Review 443. 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
2.5.2 The Delaware Case Law Formulation 
Over the years Delaware case law developed the other common formulation of the BJR. A 
hallmark of the Delaware BJR is that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 
boards (also referred to as directors) provided that the board‘s decision has a rational 
purpose.
165
 The Delaware BJR furthermore seeks to uphold the full and free exercise of the 
managerial powers which directors of Delaware corporations are granted.
166
 
The Delaware BJR was formulated in Aronson v Lewis.
167
 The court in Aronson formulated 
the BJR as: 
‗a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation 
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interest of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that 
judgment will be respected by the Courts. The burden is on the party challenging 
the decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption‘.168 
Based on the aforementioned, when a court invokes the BJR presumption, it assesses the 
boards conduct not by focusing on the outcome of a given decision or assessing the wisdom 
thereof, but instead, the court focuses on the process the board took in reaching its 
decision.
169
 Should the BJR be applied by the court, the board‘s decision will be upheld 
provided that a rational reason can be attributed to it.
170
 However, the protection provided by 
the aforementioned formulation is not absolute.
171
 The rule‘s presumptions can be rebutted by 
the plaintiff stockholder provided that the plaintiff can prove that the director breached their 
duty of care, loyalty or good faith.
172
 Should the plaintiff fail to prove that the director 
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breached any one of the previously stated duties the BJR will provide the board with 
substantive protection.
173
 
On the other hand, there are instances in which the plaintiff might succeed in proving that the 
board has breached one of their fiduciary duties.
174
 In these instances the burden shifts to the 
defendant directors and the Entire Fairness Doctrine (EFD) is applied by the courts.
175
 The 
EFD plays a pivotal role in Delaware case law alongside other enhanced standards of judicial 
scrutiny. The EFD as well as the two other standards, namely the Unocal and Revlon 
standards, will be discussed in detail in chapter 3 of this dissertation.   
 
2.6 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE COMMON FORMULATIONS  
 
The ALI formulation is purely a ‗safe harbour‘ in the sense that directors will only be 
protected by the BJR if he or she can prove the elements stipulated in paragraph 4.01(c).
176
 
With the ALI formulation the burden of proof is placed on the defendant directors as they are 
expected to prove the presence of each element provided in paragraph 4.01(c).
177
 Should the 
director be in conformity with the elements, he will not incur personal liability for a business 
decision, regardless as to how bad the outcome of the business decision may be.
178
 
 
The Delaware version of the rule differs quite fundamentally from the ALI version in that it is 
formulated as a presumption.
179
 Therefore, instead of placing the burden on the directors to 
prove that they have fulfilled their fiduciary duties in order to be protected by the BJR, the 
directors are presumed to have acted in conformity with their duties.
180
 Unlike the ALI 
version, the initial burden is placed on the plaintiff stockholders who are required to prove 
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that the directors breached one or more of their fiduciary duties.
181
 This version furthermore 
includes a potential additional step in the court proceedings as it requires the directors to 
prove that the business decision and transaction were fair towards the corporation and its 
stockholders.
182
 This step will only be relied upon in cases where the stockholder successfully 
rebuts the presumption.
183
 
Although the BJR has different formulations, it is furthermore interpreted in different 
manners. The manner in which the rule is interpreted can largely influence the judicial 
findings regarding the liability of directors.
184
 It is thus necessary to consider the various 
interpretations of the BJR.  
2.7 COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
There are two traditional interpretations of the BJR which arise out of American corporate 
case law.
185
 These interpretations are referred to as the standard of review approach and the 
abstention doctrine.
186
 However, in addition to the two additional approaches, a newer 
interpretation of the rule was established which is the rule as an immunity doctrine.
187
 The 
correct interpretation of the rule has the ability of contributing towards the innovation of 
business.
188
 This section of the dissertation will critically analyse each of the aforementioned 
interpretations as they differ quite fundamentally. 
2.7.1 Standard of Review Approach 
Traditionally, the BJR has been referred to as a standard of liability although it has never 
been enunciated as such.
189
 The effect of viewing the rule as a standard of liability is that 
courts would first review the quality of the decisions taken by the board of directors prior to 
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applying the rule but this review is however limited.
190
 Some courts and commentators are of 
the opinion that directors will be protected provided that they have acted in good faith.
191
 The 
opposing view is that the rule raises the bar from mere negligence to gross negligence or 
recklessness.
192
 Delaware courts define gross negligence and recklessness as a careless 
disregard for the corporation‘s best interests.193 Therefore, if a director makes a business 
decision and disregards the substantial and justifiable risk, he or she could be said to have 
been grossly negligent or reckless.
194
 
The case of Cede & Co. v Technicolor Inc. clearly illustrates the rule as a standard of 
liability. When dealing with the matter, the Superior Court focused on the board of directors‘ 
decision-making process.
195
 The court was of the opinion that there were some deficiencies in 
the procedure followed by the board in order to reach its decision and as a result the court 
was of the opinion that the duty of care was breached.
196
 Based on the aforementioned it is 
clear that the courts review the decision-making procedure followed by directors but the 
review by the courts is limited. The problem here is that by viewing the rule as a standard of 
liability, courts will be doing exactly what the BJR was created to avoid, which is the 
interference with business decisions.
197
 
2.7.2 The Rule as an Abstention Doctrine  
‗According to this interpretation of the rule, the presumption of good faith does 
not create a standard of liability, but it rather creates a negative presumption of 
the judicial review of due diligence and prudence‘.198 
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In other words, courts refrain from questioning the business decision taken by directors as the 
presumption assumes that the board of directors have acted in accordance with the 
requirements of the rule.
199
 When the BJR is referred to as an abstention doctrine the rule 
becomes a procedural guide as it requires the plaintiff to rebut the presumption by producing 
facts which could prove that the director failed to act in accordance with his or her duties.
200
 
Failure to produce such evidence results in the director being protected by the rule and the 
effect thereof is that the director will not be held personally liable.
201
 Commentators such as 
Professor Bainbridge are of the opinion that the BJR is better viewed as an abstention 
doctrine.
202
 When it is viewed as an abstention doctrine courts will refuse to interfere with the 
business decision taken by directors regardless as to whether the decision proves to be 
detrimental to the corporation provided that it has a rational basis.
203
 
Case law has made it quite evident that the interpretation of the BJR as an abstention doctrine 
is adopted by Delaware courts. The Aronson case cites two cases to support its statement of 
the BJR as including a presumption.
204
 In Kaplan v Centex Corp the Chancellor stated that 
the acts of directors are ‗presumptively acts performed in good faith and in the best interest of 
the company and the minority shareholder who challenges the bona fides, also referred to as 
good faith, purpose has the burden of proof‘.205 This clearly indicates that courts support the 
conception of the BJR as a presumption which in essence means that it supports the rule‘s 
explanation as an abstention doctrine. 
The Shlensky v Wrigley case is referred to as the baseline case which refers to the rule as an 
abstention doctrine. The court stated that the judiciary should only intervene in business 
decisions in instances where directors‘ decisions prove to be tainted by fraudulent interests.206 
However, the court goes further to state that in instances where fraud and conflict of interests 
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are not present, the conduct of the directors should be regarded as absolute when they are 
making business decisions.
207
 In these instances, the court does not have the authority to 
substitute its judgment for that of directors.
208
 Instead, the courts will apply the BJR and the 
directors will not be held liable for the harm suffered by the corporation.
209
 
2.7.3 The Rule as an Immunity Doctrine 
The BJR as an immunity doctrine requires the directors to be insulated from incurring 
personal liability for actions performed while acting in their capacity as directors.
210
 The 
immunity doctrine enables directors to be comfortable with their business decisions and 
should unsatisfied stockholders take action against them, they could be protected.
211
 The idea 
is for directors to be able to exercise their discretionary rights in order for their duties to be 
performed effectively.
212
 
In adopting this interpretation of the rule, the court will be highlighting the importance of the 
position of an individual as a director instead of highlighting the importance of the person 
filling the position.
213
 This doctrine operates in a similar manner to the standard of review 
approach, since the effect is the same.
214
 Both forms of interpretation insulate directors from 
liability for their business decisions which cause harm to the corporation.
215
 The rules are 
similar in that the courts will first analyse the directors‘ decision prior to granting them the 
immunity.
216
 However, the procedural analysis is different as it focuses on situations which 
could disqualify the directors from the immunity afforded by the BJR.
217
 Factors such as 
fraud, self-dealing or the director‘s failure to ensure that he is fully informed could lead to 
disqualification from the protection afforded by the rule.
218
 
Although Delaware courts have interpreted the BJR as an abstention doctrine by viewing the 
rule as a presumption, the standard of review interpretation of the rule is increasingly being 
                                                          
207
 Shlensky v Wrigley (1968). 
208
 Shlensky v Wrigley (1968). 
209
 Triem F ‗Judicial Schizophrenia in Corporate Law: Confusing the Standard of Care with the Business 
Judgment Rule‘ available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1071&context=alr(accessed on 30 June 2016).  
210
 McMillan L (2013) 542. 
211
 McMillan L (2013) 530. 
212
 Ponta A & Catana R (2015) 131. 
213
 Ponta A & Catana R (2015) 131. 
214
 Ponta A & Catana R (2015) 131. 
215
 Ponta A & Catana R (2015) 131. 
216
 Ponta A & Catana R (2015) 131. 
217
 McMillan L (2013) 530. 
218
 McMillan L (2013) 542. 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
widely accepted by some members of the Delaware courts.
219
 It could thus be argued that the 
prevailing interpretation of the rule is the rule as a standard of review. Directors are required 
to prove that certain elements have been met before receiving the protection afforded by the 
rule.
220
 The next section of this chapter will critically analyse the elements of the Delaware 
BJR. These elements play a crucial role as courts will take each element into consideration in 
order to ensure that the director made a business decision in the required manner.
221
 
2.8 ELEMENTS OF THE DELAWARE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
In order for the BJR to shield directors from liability and to protect directors‘ decisions from 
judicial second-guessing, four elements are taken into consideration.
222
 As previously 
mentioned the business decision needs to be an informed decision, which was made in good 
faith and the board of directors honestly believed that the decision taken would be in the best 
interest of the company.
223
 As previously mentioned, although Delaware courts have treated 
the rule as a presumption, they began shifting away from this approach and instead began 
viewing the rule as a standard of review.
224
 The courts will thus consider certain elements in 
order to determine whether the directors should be afforded the protection of the BJR.
225
 
These elements will be discussed in detail below. 
2.8.1 Business Decision 
The director must have made a conscious decision and properly evaluate the risks involved in 
making the decision.
226
  Where the director failed to act, he or she will not be protected by the 
rule, unless the director made a deliberate decision not to act.
227
 Decisions can be divided into 
ordinary and extraordinary decisions.
228
 Ordinary decisions are decisions such as the 
sanctioning of a dividend whereas extraordinary decisions would be the decision to merge a 
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large asset and the approval of the stockholders is necessary.
229
 As far as ordinary decisions 
are concerned the application of the rule appears to be straightforward whereas with 
extraordinary decisions the application is far more complicated, however the latter will be 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
230
 
2.8.2 Informed Decision 
Directors are required to inform themselves prior to making a business decision, of all the 
material information reasonably available to them.
231
 Although the board must be reasonably 
informed, the board is not expected to be reasonably informed of every fact.
232
 In order to 
determine whether the board was informed of all the material information, the court will 
consider the quality of the information, the advice considered by the board and whether the 
board had sufficient opportunity to acquire knowledge regarding the situation, prior to acting 
on it.
233
 Directors should carefully examine information in order to protect the interest of the 
company.
234
 
The expectation of the directors to make informed decisions is interrelated with the duty of 
care.
235
 In the Cede case the Delaware Supreme Court referred to the Van Gorkom case in 
order to find that the defendant directors breached their duty of care by making an 
uninformed business decision.
236
 The duty of care thus requires the directors to inform 
themselves of all the material information reasonably available to them and this should be 
done prior to making the decision.
237
 
2.8.3 Absence of Conflict of Interest 
A further requirement is that a director should not have an interest in the subject matter of the 
decision. An example of a conflict of interest is when a director has a direct financial interest 
in the matter which could result in the decision being tainted for the benefit of the director.
238
 
Therefore, in order to be protected by the BJR corporate directors are required to be 
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disinterested and independent.
239
 Independence means that a director‘s decision is based on 
the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than inessential influences that 
would convert a valid business decision into a faithless act.
240
 
As previously discussed under the ‗Director‘s Duties‘ section of this dissertation, it was 
clearly stated that the duty of loyalty requires the directors to have no financial or personal 
interest in the business transaction.
241
 It is thus clear that the duty of loyalty comes into effect 
with the ‗absence of conflict of interest‘ element of the BJR.   
2.8.4 Rational Basis 
A decision taken by a director needs to be capable of having a coherent explanation.
242
 When 
making a business decision, directors are required to act in good faith which ultimately means 
that directors should be honest.
243
 It has further been argued that a director, who acts 
irrationally or unwisely, may not be acting in good faith.
244
 Similarly, if a director acts 
without a rational business purpose, the court will be of the opinion that he acted in bad 
faith.
245
 
Directors are however not guaranteed the protection afforded by the presumption created by 
the BJR.
246
 In instances where the plaintiff proves that the director breached his or her duty of 
care or acted in bad faith the presumption will be rebutted and the director will not be 
afforded the protection granted by the rule.
247
 
Although the elements need to be present in order for the BJR to be applied, the BJR will not 
be applicable to anyone. It is thus essential to consider who can be protected by the rule based 
on the position they fulfil. 
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2.9 APPLICATION OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
American case law illustrates that the application of the rule has been extended to trustees, 
chief accountants in the capacity of temporary directors and the controlling shareholder, 
when carrying out managerial functions normally performed by directors or managers.
248
 On 
the other hand, the minority shareholders and employees have not been covered by this 
rule.
249
 Delaware courts have furthermore extended the application of the rule to officers.
250
 
Recent cases in states such as California have however stated that officers should not be 
afforded the protection provided by the BJR.
251
 
It is important to bear in mind that a director will only be afforded the protection of the rule if 
he or she is a disinterested director.
252
  The rule is thus inapplicable to intimidated directors 
and uninformed directors.
253
 A director is considered to be an intimidated director in 
instances where he allows another director with a financial or personal interest in the matter, 
to influence him in making a business decision.
254
 Therefore, although a director is 
disinterested, if he allows an interested director to intimidate him into making a decision, he 
will be considered interested.
255
 Uninformed directors on the other hand, are directors who 
fail to spend considerable time in making the decision and who furthermore do not obtain 
advice from qualified experts.
256
 
Now that there is an understanding as to the history of the rule and how it operates, it is 
necessary to consider the importance of the rule. The policy justifications of the rule will be 
considered as it furthermore illustrates why the BJR is important and why Delaware courts 
deemed it necessary to establish the rule.  
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2.10 THE PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
 
The rule emerged because of the need to protect persons owing duties to companies and it 
serves as a safe haven for those individuals who made a decision in conformity with the 
elements of the rule.
257
 In commercial terms the BJR bestows economic freedoms and 
freedom of entrepreneurship to directors guided by ‗the best interest of the company‘.258 
The most commonly cited reasons for the existence of the rule are that it promotes risk 
taking, encourages competent persons to serve as directors, prevents judicial second-guessing 
and it allows directors sufficient freedom to manage the company.
259
 These purposes will be 
discussed below. 
2.10.1 Promotes Risk Taking 
Given the inherently risky character of business decisions, the most thought through 
decisions could end disastrously.
260
 The duties of directors consist of establishing corporate 
policy, weighing major business decisions and overseeing management.
261
 The decisions 
taken by directors may not be susceptible to a right or wrong analysis at the time they are 
made.
262
 Although the decisions of directors were not wrongly made, the decision may prove 
to be wrong at a later stage.
263
 If no protection was provided to directors for risk entailed 
business decisions, they would have been far more cautious and hesitant to take risks which 
in essence could be beneficial to the company.
264
 Therefore, the BJR encourages directors to 
take risks which are essentially beneficial to the shareholders because they will receive better 
investment returns.
265
 The removal of the BJR could cause honest directors to exercise 
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excessive caution and this may supress effective leadership.
266
 The BJR therefore acts as a 
mechanism which allows directors to have more discretion and it allows companies to 
regulate its risk levels.
267
 Without the rule the courts would indirectly be determining the risk 
level of companies.
268
 
2.10.2 Competent Directors 
It can be argued that the BJR actually encourages qualified and experienced persons to act as 
directors.
269
 If the aforementioned persons knew that they could easily incur personal liability 
for risky business decisions, it could easily deter them from fulfilling the position as a 
director.
270
 The BJR is thus designed to provide the directors with protection in their business 
decision and in essence it ensures that directors will not be deterred from pursuing potentially 
profitable, but risky, endeavours.
271
 
 
2.10.3 Avoiding Judicial Encroachment and Promoting Judicial Efficiency 
 
It has been argued that courts and judges are not in the best position to evaluate business 
decisions as it does not fall within their scope of expertise.
272
 Courts and commentators have 
suggested that the complexity of business matters is beyond the intellectual reach of courts 
and litigation is thus not always a suitable tool to evaluate corporate business decisions.
273
 
Courts could end up becoming ‗super directors‘ if they scrutinize and fail to respect the 
decisions made by honest directors in good faith and on a rational basis.
274
 The case of 
Warshaw v Calhoun supports the aforementioned rationale.
275
 The court wrote that the 
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judiciary should not interfere with the business judgment of directors in cases where there is a 
failure to prove bad faith on the part of the director or gross abuse of his or her discretion.
276
 
The rule furthermore promotes judicial efficiency as it allows courts to preserve their 
valuable resources by disposing of complex business litigation.
277
 Without the rule, the 
stockholders will have more reason to flood the court with derivative suits and the court is 
already operating under the constraints of scarce resources.
278
 Therefore, in preventing the 
courts from being flooded with derivative suits the courts will be in a position to focus on 
more important matters.  
2.10.4 Designed to achieve a compromise 
The BJR is designed to achieve a compromise between two competing values.
279
 This 
compromise needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis by evaluating the exercise of 
authority and liability.
280
 ‗Authority‘ refers to the need to preserve the directors‘ decision 
making powers whilst ‗liability‘ indicates the importance of being able to hold a director 
accountable for the breach of his duties.
281
 Authority and liability cannot exist independently 
in modern corporate law and the rule thus plays a vital role in striking a balance between the 
two.
282
 The problem with the existence of authority and liability is that it allows for an 
increase in corporate opportunism which includes cases such as self-dealing, common errors, 
negligence and carelessness.
283
 The BJR thus plays an important role in these situations as it 
ensures that directors will only be afforded protection in instances where one of the 
aforementioned factors is not present.
284
 Directors thus have knowledge of the fact that if 
they act in a manner which is contrary to their duties, they will incur personal liability. The 
amount being claimed from the director would most likely not be a small amount and not 
only will the director have a bad reputation for breaching his duties but he could furthermore 
                                                          
276
 Warshaw v Calhoun A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966).  
277
 Branson D (2002) 632. 
278
 Park J ‗The Business Judgment Rule: A Missing Piece in the Developing Puzzle of Korean Corporate 
Governance Reform‘ (2003) 3 Journal of Korean Law 30.   
279
 Ibrahim D ‗Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate Directors?‘ available at 
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2726&context=facpubs (accessed 23 March 2016). 
280
 Scarlett A ‗A Better Approach for Balancing Authority and Accountability in Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation‘ available at https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/20095/02-
Scarlett_Final.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed on 20 March 2016).  
281
 Ponta A & Catana R (2015) 127. 
282
 Ponta A & Catana R (2015) 127. 
283
 Ponta A ‗The business judgment rule - approach and application‘ 5 (2015) Judicial Tribune 36 (Hereafter 
referred to as Ponta A (2015). 
284
 Ponta A (2015) 36. 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
be dismissed from the corporation. The BJR can therefore be referred to as a barrier which 
ensures that directors are careful when performing their duties.
285
 
Although the BJR was designed to achieve the aforementioned rationales, the rule has its 
shortfalls. These shortfalls could potentially have a negative impact on the countries who 
adopt the Delaware BJR into their corporate law.
286
 
2.11 SHORTFALLS OF THE DELWARE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
Confusion with respect to the BJR has been created by numerous varying formulations of the 
rule and the fact that courts have often stated the rule incompletely or with elliptical 
shorthand references contributes to this confusion.
287
 The expansion of the rule by Delaware 
courts appear to be the centre of all problems surrounding the rule and various issues such as 
uncertainty and complexity flow from the Delaware formulation.
288
 The alterations to the 
application of the rule promote lack of consensus regarding the rule‘s application.289 Samuel 
Arsht is of the opinion that the misunderstanding surrounding the rule stems from the general 
failure to distinguish the BJR from presumptions and limitations surrounding the rule‘s 
application and from the courts‘ tendency of using poor language in expressing the rule.290 
The exact relationship between the BJR and the duty of care remains an enigma and it is a 
source of great confusion.
291
 Some academics are of the opinion that the rule defines the 
contents of a director‘s duty of care whilst others feel that the rule should be an element of 
the duty of care instead of it being the other way around.
292
 In other words, they feel that the 
rule sets the required standard of care which is expected from directors.
293
  Although the rule 
and the duty of care are interrelated, the BJR was not designed to be a substitute for the duty 
of care.
294
 In Delaware, the rule is being prioritized whilst the duty of care is not receiving the 
same attention and in doing so the courts are deeming directors to be performing at a higher 
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level than they might actually be performing.
295
 In prioritizing the BJR, courts are failing to 
sufficiently emphasise the affirmative nature of directors‘ duties.296 The rule after all 
presumes that directors have acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the decision is in the best interest of the company.
297
 Commentators argue that directors 
should not get the benefit of the doubt that they are fulfilling their duties unless proven 
differently.
298
 There should instead be certainty that they are affirmatively fulfilling their 
duties.
299
 The obligation of affirmatively fulfilling their duties is masked by the formulation 
of the rule as a presumption as this formulation misleadingly suggests that directors have 
fulfilled their duties.
300
 
The countless formulations of the rule have caused uncertainty about the rule‘s contents. The 
Delaware Supreme Court recently held that the Delaware cases describing the rule have been 
imprecise and as a result, it contributed to confusion and misuse of the rule.
301
 The confusion 
pertaining to the scope and application of the rule began early as it is present in the case of 
Percy v Millaudon.
302
 On the one hand the rule is described as insulating corporate directors 
and officers from personal liability or as validating corporate dealings. The interpretation of 
the rule can largely influence the judicial findings regarding the liability of directors.
303
 In 
some instances the Delaware courts refer to the rule as a presumption but they seem unaware 
of what the law of evidence teaches the legal community about presumptions.
304
 The 
presumption in this context assumes that a director‘s decision was taken in accordance with 
the required standard of care.
305
 However, if the plaintiff, who is the shareholder, can prove 
that the duty of care was breached, the presumption will fall away.
306
 The problem with 
viewing the rule as a presumption is illustrated in the case of In re Walt Disney Company 
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Derivative Litigation. The plaintiff proved the director‘s lack of independence and in doing 
so the presumption should have been rebutted.
307
 The court however refused to review the 
merits of the decision and the BJR was applied.
308
 
Delaware‘s lack of deliberation on the use and misuse of the presumption may not be 
problematic in Delaware but it could affect outcomes elsewhere.
309
 It will not be problematic 
in the State of Delaware because the Delaware courts have an understanding as to how the 
presumption of the BJR is to be applied.
310
 They require a lot more proof before a 
presumption can be rebutted by the plaintiff stockholder whereas courts in other countries 
might merely require a ‗pin prick‘ to rebut the presumption.311 This pin prick refers to a mere 
establishment of conflict of interest which would lead to the presumption being rebutted.
312
 
For example, Indiana incorporated the Delaware BJR into its corporate law and this rule was 
blended with Indiana‘s understanding of a presumption.313 The problem is that the courts in 
Indiana will come to a completely different result in comparison to the Delaware courts with 
the risk of holding directors liable.
314
 Based on the aforementioned, the problem is that 
Delaware courts are familiar with their way of having a presumption rebutted whereas in 
other countries this might differ significantly.
315
 
Courts in Delaware have stated that the BJR applies to officers but they have not analytically 
linked the rule to the fiduciary duties of corporate officers.
316
 Therefore, in cases concerning 
officers, it remains unclear whether judges will deploy the BJR in the same manner that it has 
been used for corporate directors.
317
 The Delaware courts have not had the opportunity to 
fully consider the policy case for and against the application of the rule to officers and as a 
result, the applicability of the rule to corporate officers remains a topic of concern.
318
 The 
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case of Gantler v Stephens is a perfect illustration of the court‘s failure to deal with the 
applicability of the rule to corporate officers.
319
 The court merely dealt with the fiduciary 
duties of the officers and the analysis of the applicability of the rule in the case was 
conspicuously absent.
320
 This is evident because the court found the officers liable for the 
breach of their fiduciary duties and there was clearly no application of the rule.
321
 Therefore, 
as far as officers in Delaware are concerned, there is currently no pre-existing historical 
policy or doctrinal connection between fiduciary duties and the BJR, as the case is with 
directors.
322
 It is thus uncertain as to whether Delaware courts will apply the approach 
adopted for directors to officers. 
2.12 CONCLUSION 
Although in certain parts of this chapter the BJR rule in America was analysed, the focus was 
particularly placed on the Delaware BJR. Having discussed different formulations of the rule, 
it is evident that the Delaware case law formulation plays a more prominent role as it has 
been largely adopted across America. Delaware courts may have started off applying the 
straightforward BJR but a change came about. Initially, Delaware courts refrained from 
interfering with the business decisions of directors but eventually the courts deviated from the 
abstention doctrine approach and began adopting a standard of review approach. However, it 
should be borne in mind that the standard of review approach is only adopted in certain 
transactions which warrant the interference of the court. In adopting a standard of review 
approach, Delaware courts began expanding the BJR and gave it fresh meanings in different 
situations. These situations include mergers and acquisitions as well as insolvent transactions. 
In these transactions, Delaware courts have adopted a heightened standard of judicial review 
by creating the Entire Fairness Doctrine, Unocal Standard and the Revlon Standard. In doing 
so, a straightforward rule has now become a complex rule.  
The question which thus arises pertains to the certain transactions to which the rule will be 
applied by Delaware courts. As previously mentioned, these transactions consist of mergers 
and acquisitions as well as insolvent transactions but the subsequent chapter will focus the 
lens on particular detail pertaining to these transactions as well as the aforementioned 
heightened standards of judicial review. It was thus necessary to first understand the 
                                                          
319
 Gantler v Stephens 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
320
 Gantler v Stephens 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
321
 Johnson L (accessed on 04 March 2016) 414. 
322
 Johnson L (accessed on 04 March 2016) 415. 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
straightforward version of the BJR in order to become familiar with the background, purpose 
and formulation of the rule. With having this understanding, it will become easier to 
understand why and how Delaware courts have stepped away from the straightforward 
version of the rule, which is the ultimate purpose of chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE APPLICATION OF THE DELAWARE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN 
FUNDAMENTAL TRANSACTIONS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
As noted in chapter two, the origin of the BJR lies in America and for over 150 years the rule 
performed a relatively straightforward task.
323
 Prior to the 1980s, the Delaware BJR provided 
directors with protection against liability for honest mistakes provided that they acted 
carefully, with loyalty and in good faith.
324
 This version of the rule is referred to as the 
‗traditional business judgment rule‘.325 However, in the 1980s Delaware courts began 
developing and expanding the application of the rule.
326
 The courts realised that certain 
situations require the shareholders to be granted more protection against the business 
decisions of directors.
327
 As a result, in certain transactions courts might deviate from the 
BJR and instead, the courts will apply an enhanced standard of judicial review. According to 
Chief Justice Strine, ‗the heightened scrutiny applies because of a concern that the board 
might harbour personal motivations in the sale context that differ from what is best for the 
corporation and its stockholders‘.328 
This expanded BJR is what commentators view as the ‗modern business judgment rule‘, as 
courts will determine whether the boards‘ decision is worthy of respect and this occurs prior 
to determining whether the BJR is applicable or not.
329
 In doing so the courts have illustrated 
that the modern BJR is not a one-size-fits-all doctrine but rather a movable boundary, 
marking the shifting line between judicial scrutiny and judicial deference‘.330 Delaware courts 
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have thus been applying the rule in various types of mergers and acquisitions transactions 
(hereafter referred to as M&A) as well as in insolvent trading transactions. 
The purpose of this chapter is thus to dissect M&A and insolvent trading, in order to critically 
analyse how courts have dealt with actions brought against the directors‘ for their business 
decisions in the aforementioned transactions. Initially the focus will be placed on M&A 
transactions and an explanation of mergers and acquisitions will be provided for purposes of 
a holistic approach and better understanding. Thereafter the directors‘ duties in M&A 
transactions will be explained as it will provide an understanding as to why the courts have 
been applying the traditional BJR to the transactions. This section will furthermore illustrate 
why and how Delaware courts have deviated from the application of the traditional rule in 
order to apply an enhanced standard of review instead. These enhanced standards consist of 
the EFD, the Unocal Standard and the Revlon Standard. The focus will then shift to insolvent 
trading and the duties imposed on directors in these circumstances will be analysed. 
Thereafter the application of the BJR to director‘s decisions‘ taken while a company is 
insolvent and near insolvency will be dealt with.  
3.2 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
In order to grasp a complete understanding as to why Delaware courts have been applying the 
BJR and in some instances a heightened standard of judicial review, to the decision of 
directors taken in M&A transactions, it is necessary to define and discuss the terms. An 
understanding of M&A has become increasingly important in modern businesses as it is 
always taking place in the corporate world.
331
 
3.2.1 Defining Merger and Acquisition 
The subsequent definitions of merger and acquisition will illustrate that the meanings of the 
terms differ but because they ultimately lead to two companies becoming one, the terms are 
used interchangeably.
332
 Merger refers to the process of the joining together of two 
companies.
333
 When companies merge they combine their resources into a single business 
and it results in the owners of the pre-merger companies having to share in the ownership of 
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the merged business.
334
 Acquisitions, also referred to as takeovers, involve a process whereby 
the acquirer, usually a bigger financially sound firm, purchases the target company which is 
considerably smaller.
335
  As far as acquisition is concerned, the acquirer (the purchaser) can 
purchase a part of or the entire target company (the company being purchased).
336
 
Acquisitions consist of friendly and hostile acquisitions which largely depend on how the 
target company perceives the acquirer.
337
 In friendly takeovers, the board of directors of the 
target firm is willing to agree to the acquisitions whereas with a hostile takeover, the board 
opposes the acquisition.
338
 
Directors play very important roles in M&A transactions and their decisions can largely 
impact the company which in essence impacts the shareholders. There are various negative 
consequences of M&A‘s which can affect the shareholders. Among these consequences are 
the possibilities of a temporary drop in share value as well as volatile stock prices.
339
 
Shareholders can furthermore experience a dilution of voting power caused by an increased 
number of shares released during the merger process.
340
 It could be argued that the negative 
consequences faced by shareholders coupled with the inherent conflicts directors might have 
in M&A transactions, have convinced Delaware courts that shareholders are in need of more 
protection.
341
 The next section will thus consider the duties directors are required to perform 
when making vital decisions in M&As.  
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3.2.2 Director’s Duties in M&A Transactions 
As previously discussed in chapter 2, the board of directors of a corporation owe fiduciary 
duties to the corporation. These duties consist of the duty of care, duty of loyalty and the duty 
to act in good faith. Although these duties were discussed in chapter 2, it is necessary to 
highlight important aspects of these duties as far as it relates to M&A transactions.  
The first duty being considered is the duty of care, which in M&A transactions requires the 
directors to take sufficient time when making decisions regarding the sale or purchase of a 
company.
342
 Directors should furthermore ensure that expert opinion, such as that of a 
financial advisor, is obtained in certain instances when deemed necessary.
343
 Prior to making 
final decisions, directors should inform themselves of alternatives to selling or purchasing a 
company.
344
 If the director acted in a manner which is consistent with the aforementioned, he 
will be protected by the rule.
345
 However, if the director was grossly negligent he will lose the 
protection of the rule.
346
 ‗Gross negligence‘ is the standard applied by Delaware courts in 
order to determine whether the directors have failed to fulfil their duty of care.
347
 If a director 
has engaged in misconduct which is more culpable than simple inattention or failure to be 
informed of all facts, the court will view the directors‘ actions as grossly negligent.348 
The second duty is the duty of loyalty which requires the directors to avoid acting for a 
personal or non-corporate purpose.
349
 Directors should thus not profit from the sale of the 
company in a manner which will not benefit the shareholders.
350
 In other words, a director 
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should recuse himself from the board if he is aware that a conflict of interest is present.
351
  
However, in instances where a director is interested in the transaction, directors and 
shareholders who are disinterested and fully informed may permit interested director 
transactions.
352
 In the case of Parnes v Bally Entertainment Corp, the plaintiff challenged the 
merger of Bally with Hilton Hotels.
353
 The court was of the opinion that the plaintiff needed 
to prove that, 
‗a majority of directors will receive a personal benefit from the transaction that 
is not equally shared by the shareholders….or where a corporate decision will 
have a materially detrimental impact on a director but not on the corporation and 
shareholders or that a majority of the directors were ‗beholden‘ to an interested 
party or so under the influence of an interested party that the directors discretion 
would be sterilised‘.354 
As far as the duty of good faith is concerned, challenges to a director‘s duty of good faith 
were initially included in the courts inquiry into the director‘s satisfaction of his duties of 
care and loyalty.
355
 Delaware courts began separating the duty of good faith and it began 
existing independently of the duties of care and loyalty.
356
 Thus in instances where the 
directors ‗consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities‘ they will be 
considered to have breached their duty of good faith.
357
 
The duties discussed above illustrates that even in M&A transactions, directors are expected 
to perform their fiduciary duties and as a result, they should be entitled to the protection of 
the BJR. Below is a discussion on the application of the traditional BJR in M&A transactions. 
It should be borne in mind that, as mentioned in chapter 2, the BJR prevents directors from 
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incurring personal liability for the harm suffered by a company as a result of the directors‘ 
decision.
358
 
3.3 APPLICATION OF THE TRADITIONAL BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
In instances where directors fulfil the above mentioned fiduciary duties in M&A transactions, 
Delaware courts will apply the traditional BJR. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, 
the traditional BJR is a straightforward rule. In Delaware, the courts will presume that the 
directors have acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interest of the company.
359
 
Although courts apply the traditional rule in the aforementioned instances, there have been 
cases in which Delaware courts have deviated from the application of the rule by applying an 
enhanced standard of judicial scrutiny.
360
 These standards were created after Delaware courts 
realised that plaintiff shareholders needed protection from directors who were not acting in 
the company‘s best interests during M&A transactions.361 Delaware courts began realising 
that plaintiff shareholders experience an uphill battle when having to rebut the presumption 
of the traditional rule.
362
 Furthermore, only in instances where a plaintiff can prima facie 
prove that the directors violated a fiduciary duty will the presumption be rebutted.
363
 This has 
proven to be difficult and as a result thereof, Delaware courts found it necessary to provide 
shareholders with more protection and this protection was provided by way of deviating from 
the traditional rule.
364
 It should however be borne in mind that the concern to protect 
shareholders is coupled with the fact that certain transactions, specifically M&A transactions, 
usually contain conflicts of interest on behalf of the directors.
365
 The standards consist of the 
Entire Fairness Doctrine (EFD), the Unocal Standard and the Revlon Standard.
366
 The next 
step of this chapter is to critically discuss each of the enhanced standards applied by 
Delaware courts to certain M&A transactions. The discussion will illustrate that in certain 
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cases the courts will first apply an enhanced standard of review prior to deciding whether the 
BJR should be invoked in order to protect the director.  
3.4 ENHANCED STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 
3.4.1 The Entire Fairness Doctrine 
The EFD is applied by Delaware courts in instances where the BJR is relied upon by directors 
but the presumption of the rule has been rebutted by the plaintiff shareholders.
367
 This means 
that the shareholders have managed to prove that the directors have failed to act in a manner 
which is fair to the company and its stockholders.
368
 This doctrine is the most onerous 
standard which is applied in instances ‗where a majority of directors approving the 
transaction were interested or where a majority stockholder stands on both sides of the 
transaction‘.369 If the directors appear on both sides of the transaction or they expect to obtain 
a personal financial benefit, the directors can be referred to as interested directors for the 
purpose of the application of the EFD.
370
 
The effect of the EFD is that the burden of proof is shifted from the plaintiff shareholders to 
the directors, provided that the shareholders have rebutted the presumption created by the 
BJR.
371
 The directors are thus required to prove that both the process that was followed in 
reaching a decision as well as the costs involved in the business transaction was fair to the 
stockholders of a corporation.
372
 In order to determine whether fair dealing took place the 
court will question the process followed in reaching a decision.
373
 The courts will question 
how the transaction was timed, initiated, structured, negotiated and disclosed and it will 
furthermore consider how the approvals of directors and the stockholders are obtained.
374
 Fair 
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price on the other hand relates to the economic and financial aspects of the transaction and in 
determining whether the price was fair, courts will consider the market value and assets of the 
company as well as other valuation metrics and a fairness opinion.
375
 Courts will thus always 
analyse fair price and fair dealing in conjunction as the EFD requires courts to scrutinise all 
aspects of the business transaction to ensure fairness.
376
 In essence, unlike the BJR, the EFD 
enables the full judicial review of whether directors have satisfied their fiduciary duties, 
specifically the duty of loyalty.
377
 
The case of Gantler v Stephens, which concerns the takeover of First Niles Company, 
perfectly illustrates the application of the EFD by the Delaware Supreme Court.
378
 The court 
was of the opinion that the plaintiff shareholders met their burden of proof by pleading facts 
‗sufficient to establish that three directors were disloyal and this was sufficient to rebut the 
business judgment presumption‘.379 In conducting a director-specific analysis the court found 
that the majority members of the board were conflicted.
380
 One of the instances in which the 
court found conflict was the failure of the Chairman and CEO to respond to a due diligence 
as requested by a bidder and the court was thus of the view that in failing to respond, the 
Chairman acted in his own personal financial interest, as opposed to the interests of the 
shareholders.
381
 The fact that two of the directors owned businesses which provided services 
to First Niles is another instance in which the court found conflict.
382
 The occurrence of the 
takeover would cause the business owned by the directors to suffer and the services they 
provide to First Niles would be in jeopardy thereby causing the directors to be interested in 
the matter.
383
 The court thus held that the Chancery court should have applied the EFD as it 
was satisfied that the plaintiff shareholders proved the disloyalty of directors.
384
 The court 
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further noted that although the transaction was not complete and it would be difficult to 
determine the fair price of the transaction, the EFD can be applied in a non-transaction 
context.
385
 In instances where the EFD is applied and directors fail to prove fair price and fair 
dealing, they will be held personally liable for the harm suffered by the company.
386
 
It should however be borne in mind that if directors succeed in proving that the transaction 
was fair to the entire corporation, the court will apply the BJR and the directors will be 
exculpated from liability.
387
 Having discussed the EFD, which is the most onerous standard 
of them all it is necessary to consider the Unocal standard. As will be illustrated below, this 
standard bridges the gap between the BJR and the EFD.  
3.4.2 The Unocal Standard 
In 1985, Delaware courts were faced with numerous cases pertaining to corporate takeover 
activity in America, many of which were hostile.
388
 As touched on earlier in the chapter, a 
hostile takeover is an acquisition in which the target company does not want to be purchased 
or does not want to be purchased by a particular buyer making an offer.
389
 The Unocal Corp. 
v. Mesa Petroleum Co case introduced what is now referred to as the Unocal standard and 
often best described as ‗the conditional business judgment rule‘.390 The rule introduced an 
intermediate form of judicial review as it bridges the gap between the BJR and the EFD.
391
 
The BJR was not stringent enough to apply to hostile takeover cases as conflict of interest is 
inherent in these types of transactions.
392
 Plaintiff shareholders would have to rebut the rule 
by proving that the directors‘ decision involved fraud, illegality or self-dealing and doing so 
has proven to be difficult.
393
 On the other hand, the application of the EFD is too stringent in 
hostile takeover cases as directors are required to show that the defensive measure taken was 
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objectively fair to the corporation.
394
 This is an exceedingly difficult burden to bear and it 
was extremely difficult for directors to satisfy the burden thus resulting in increased director 
liability.
395
As a result of the above mentioned concerns, the Delaware Supreme Court 
developed the Unocal standard.   
This standard allows for enhanced judicial scrutiny to take place in that it requires the court to 
assess, among other things, the substantive reasonableness of the boards‘ decisions.396 This 
takes place without the plaintiff shareholder proving that the board breached its duty of 
loyalty or was grossly negligent in making the business decision.
397
 The Delaware Supreme 
Court in the Unocal case has observed that conflict of interest is inherent in takeover bids. 
‗Because of the omnipresent spectre that a board may be acting primarily in its 
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is 
an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the 
protection of the business judgment rule may be conferred.‘398 
Therefore, when courts apply the Unocal test, there are two aspects of the test which directors 
need to satisfy in order to be protected by the BJR.
399
 The first aspect of the test requires the 
board to prove that the defensive measures taken in response to the hostile takeover were 
taken in good faith.
400
 The board furthermore needs to prove that a reasonable investigation 
was conducted which established that the corporate policy and effectiveness of the 
corporation was in danger.
401
 The second aspect of the test will be satisfied if the board can 
prove that the action taken was reasonable in relation to the threat posed by the unwanted 
bidder.
402
 Should directors satisfy the Unocal test, they will be protected by the BJR.
403
 
However, in cases where they fail to meet the Unocal test, the directors‘ defensive measures 
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will be invalidated and the courts will require the directors to show that their actions were 
entirely fair.
404
 
Having considered what the Unocal standard is and why courts created it, it is necessary to 
look at when and how Delaware courts apply Unocal. Although the manner in which courts 
apply the standard was briefly mentioned above, this section will look at it in detail. 
3.4.2.1 The application of the Unocal standard 
The Delaware courts have applied Unocal to hostile takeovers which consist of directors 
having taken defensive measures.
405
 In essence, defensive measures are taken by directors 
when trying to prevent a hostile bidder from succeeding in his or her bid for the company.
406
 
There is an array of defensive measures which the board of directors can take and an example 
of these defensive measures is referred to as the ‗poison pill‘.407 The term poison pill is almost 
always subject to takeover litigation and the term refers to a group of shareholder rights which 
are triggered by an event such as a hostile takeover.
408
 Poison pill thus provides certain 
shareholders, except the hostile bidder, with rights to purchase additional shares or to sell 
shares on very attractive terms.
409
 This places the hostile bidder at a disadvantage as he or she 
faces severe economic penalties.
410
 
As previously mentioned, when courts apply Unocal, a burden is placed on directors to satisfy 
two aspects to the Unocal test.
411
 The first aspect requires directors to prove that a good faith 
and reasonable investigation was conducted of the perceived threat and the defences available 
to the corporation.
412
 Directors will satisfy this burden if they can prove that no misconduct 
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was committed in reaching an informed decision.
413
 If the directors can prove that a lengthy 
and detailed discussion took place regarding the proposed defensive measures, the Delaware 
courts will be satisfied that the directors made an informed decision.
414
 There has been an 
instance whereby the directors‘ determination of the company‘s value was sufficient enough 
to qualify as an informed decision.
415
 As a result thereof, it has been argued that the first 
aspect of the Unocal test is rather easy for directors to satisfy.
416
 
The second aspect of the test requires the directors‘ response to have been reasonable in 
relation to the threat posed.
417
 This aspect of the test is also referred to as the proportionality 
test.
418
 The reasonableness of the response is evaluated by considering the nature of the 
takeover bid and its effect on the corporation. In instances where the board‘s response is 
coercive and not within a range of reasonable responses, the board will fail to satisfy the 
second aspect of the Unocal test.
419
 The effect thereof is that the protection afforded by the 
BJR will be lost.
420
 Delaware courts have thus accepted a comprehensive defensive strategy 
used to maintain the company‘s independence, as a reasonable defensive measure.421 
3.4.2.2 Success of the Unocal Standard 
There have been contrasting views regarding the effectiveness of the Unocal standard. 
Various commentators have viewed it as a failure and academics such as Johnson and Siegel 
have called it a ‗toothless standard‘ and dismissed it as ‗fairly inconsequential‘.422 According 
to academics, the only difference between the BJR and the Unocal test is that Unocal places 
the burden of proof on the directors while the BJR protects the directors instead of placing a 
burden on them.
423
 The aforementioned distinction serves little purpose because when 
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directors are required to satisfy the Unocal test they are basically satisfying the elements of 
the BJR.
424
 At the moment, by placing the initial burden on the directors under the Unocal 
standard, no effective and proper scrutiny of the boards‘ decision takes place.425 This has an 
adverse effect on the shareholders as they are not receiving sufficient protection.
426
 
It has been argued by various states that Delaware courts should focus on placing the initial 
burden on plaintiff shareholders thereby requiring them to prove the presence of fraud, bad 
faith or self-dealing in the defensive measures taken by the directors.
427
 In doing so, the courts 
will technically be applying an aspect of the EFD. However, instead of requiring directors to 
satisfy the elements of the EFD, the directors will have to prove the aspects of the Unocal test 
in order to be protected by the BJR.
428
 
The Delaware courts later created a modified version of the Unocal standard which is referred 
to as the Revlon Doctrine. This Doctrine will be discussed below as it is another method of 
enhanced scrutiny introduced by Delaware courts. 
3.4.3 The Revlon Doctrine 
 
In Revlon Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc, the court introduced the Revlon 
standard which deals with a particular problem, namely, the use of takeover defences to 
prevent a hostile bidder from succeeding in his bid for the corporation and control thereof.
429
 
Thus in certain sale or change of control transactions, the court will have to deviate from the 
traditional BJR and apply what has come to be known as the ‗Revlon Doctrine‘.430 It is 
important to note that change of control refers to the acquirer (the person or company 
purchasing the target company) becoming the majority or sole shareholder of the target 
company.
431
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There are two ways in which the Revlon Doctrine changes the manner in which board 
decisions are made.
432
 The first change comes about when the court requires the directors to 
no longer exercise their fiduciary duties for the long-term well-being of the company.
433
 
Instead, in cases where it is apparent that the break-up of the company is inevitable, directors 
are expected to exercise their duties in a manner, which will maximise the value of the 
company at a sale, for the stockholders to benefit.
434
 This is referred to as ‗Revlon Duties‘ or 
‗Revlon Standard‘ and in the aforementioned instances directors change from being 
defenders of the corporation to becoming ‗auctioneers charged with getting the best price for 
the stockholders at a sale of the company‘.435 
It is important to note that the Delaware Chancery Court held that ‗rather than changing the 
duties directors owe to stockholders, Revlon changes the level of scrutiny under which the 
court reviews sale or change of control transactions‘.436 This simply means that the ‗Revlon 
Duties‘ are not distinctive board duties but it is rather a changed standard of judicial 
review.
437
 This then brings about the second change caused by the Revlon Doctrine. When 
courts apply the Doctrine it will review the decision of directors with an enhanced level of 
scrutiny.
438
 This level of scrutiny requires the independent, disinterested directors to prove 
that their decision making process took place with adequate care and that their decision, both 
in substance and procedure, was reasonable under the circumstances.
439
 Emphasis should be 
placed on the word ‗reasonable‘ as it creates a higher standard in comparison to the 
‗rationality‘ standard created by the BJR.440 
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Subsequent to the Revlon decision, there has been much litigation and academic discussion 
regarding the circumstances which trigger the Revlon standard and those which do not.
441
 It 
has been argued that Revlon is not as clear as it should be and Delaware courts have not been 
consistent in dealing with the standard.
442
 The next section will delve deeper into determining 
the situations to which the Revlon standard is applied by Delaware courts.   
3.4.3.1 The Application of the Revlon Standard 
As generally accepted by Delaware courts, the Revlon standard applies to sale of a company 
or change of control transactions. The Delaware Supreme Court in the case of Arnold v. Socy 
for Sav. Bancorp, Inc has highlighted three situations to which the Revlon standard is 
applied. The court observed that: 
‗The directors of a corporation have the obligation of acting reasonably to seek 
the transaction offering the best value reasonably available to the stockholders, 
in at least the following three scenarios: (1) when a corporation initiates an 
active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganisation 
involving a clear break-up of the company; (2) where, in response to a bidders 
offer, a company abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative 
transaction involving the break-up of the company; or (3) when approval of a 
transaction results in a sale or change of control. In the latter situation, there is 
no sale or change in control when [c]ontrol of both [companies] remain[s] in a 
large, fluid, changeable and changing market‘.443 
In simple terms the Revlon standard applies to certain situations involving auctioning of the 
company, the breakup of a company as well as transfers of control.
444
 As far as the sale or 
transfer of control is concerned, Delaware courts have initially held that Revlon will not be 
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applicable in sale transactions which involve an exchange of stock.
445
 The reason for this is 
that no change of control has taken place and as previously mentioned the Revlon standard 
will only apply if a change of control has occurred.
446
 The standard will only be applied if the 
sale or change of control of a company involved cash.
447
 In other words, only in instances 
where shareholders receive cash for their shares when a company is being sold, will the 
Revlon standard be relevant.
448
 The reason for this is that the transaction is the final 
opportunity for stockholders of the target company to maximise the value of their investment 
before being barred from obtaining any future benefit from the company after the sale has 
taken place.
449
 
However, in 2011 this view changed as the court in Smurfit-Stone was of the opinion that the 
Revlon standard should be applied to mixed stock and cash mergers.
450
 In essence, if the sale 
or change of control takes place with a portion of the payment being stock whilst the rest is 
cash, the Revlon standard will be applicable.
451
 It is important to note that in mixed stock and 
cash mergers, the Revlon standard will only apply provided that the cash component of the 
sale is equal to or above 50 percent.
452
 If the cash component is equal to or below 33 percent 
the directors‘ decision will be reviewed under the BJR.453 The question then arises as to what 
happens when the cash component of the transaction falls between 33 and 50 percent.
454
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There is still uncertainty lingering in the air as to whether the court will apply the BJR or the 
Revlon standard in the aforementioned instance.
455
 
3.4.3.2 Success of the Revlon Standard 
Based on arguments provided by academics, it is clear that there is still much controversy 
surrounding the Revlon standard.
456
 In Delaware, there is uncertainty as to when to apply the 
Revlon Standard. As previously mentioned, Delaware courts have not dealt with the 
application of Revlon to mixed stock-cash payments which fall between 33-50 percent.
457
 The 
question as to whether the BJR or the Revlon standard would be applicable is yet to be 
answered. There is furthermore no judicial blueprint for Delaware directors to properly 
perform their Revlon duties in a sale of control transaction.
458
 Directors can discharge their 
Revlon duties by way of:  
‗a formal auction, a more limited pre-sign canvass of prospective financial and 
strategic buyer candidates, a limited exclusive negotiation, a passive post-sign 
market check or, in some instances, an affirmative ―go shop‖ period (with a 
subsequent ―window shop‖ period) may be appropriate or inappropriate, 
depending on the totality of facts and circumstances.‘459 
Based on the aforementioned, there is no set manner in which directors are expected to 
achieve the best value for the shareholder and some commentators find this to be rather 
problematic as it contributes to the uncertainty.
460
 Some academics are of the opinion that the 
Revlon Doctrine should be abolished.
461
 Authors such as Gevurtz find the Doctrine to be 
unnecessary in that the Unocal standard or the duty of loyalty is sufficient to deal with 
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directors when a conflict of interest is present.
462
 However, the debate regarding Revlon is 
still on-going and research has indicated that Delaware courts have continued applying the 
Doctrine.
463
 Whether the Doctrine will be abolished in the future or whether courts will 
merely refine it in order to reduce or remove uncertainties remains unanswered. It is however 
an interesting matter to look into but the purpose of this dissertation is not to focus on this 
aspect too much as this has successfully been done elsewhere. It is merely important to 
understand the rule, how it is applied and that Delaware courts have continued to apply it.  
The aforementioned makes it clear that there are various standards created by Delaware courts 
and in certain instances either one of the standards will be applied. However, it should be 
borne in mind that in instances where the director has satisfied the requirements of the 
enhanced standard being applied, he will be protected by the BJR. Having considered the 
approaches adopted by Delaware courts in M&A transactions, it is necessary to look at how 
Delaware courts have dealt with the liability of directors‘ of insolvent or near insolvent 
corporations. 
3.5 INSOLVENT TRANSACTIONS 
There are two instances in which Delaware courts have applied the BJR, namely, when a 
corporation is insolvent and when the corporation is in the zone of insolvency. This section of 
the dissertation will define each term and thereafter the duties of the board of directors will be 
discussed. The focus will be on the fiduciary duties of directors of an insolvent corporation as 
well as a corporation in the zone of insolvency. Subsequently, the rule and its application to 
insolvent transactions in Delaware will be analysed.  
3.5.1 Defining the Term ‘Insolvent’ 
The Delaware‘s Fraudulent Transfers Act, Title 6, Delaware Code §§ 1302(a)-(b) provides 
two definitions for the term ‗insolvent‘.464 The first definition provided by the Fraudulent 
Transfer‘s Act states that insolvency refers to the inability of the corporation to pay its debts 
as they become due.
465
 In determining this, Delaware courts have applied the ‗cash flow test‘ 
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in either a forward looking manner or a present manner.
466
 The forward looking version looks 
at whether the company will be able to pay its debts as they become due in the near future 
whereas the present version of the test analyses whether the corporation is currently paying its 
debts.
467
 The second definition of the term ‗insolvency‘ refers to the corporations liabilities‘ 
exceeding the fair market value of its assets.
468
 The Gheewalla case however extended the 
latter definition by observing that in instances where a company has a deficiency of assets 
which is less than its liabilities and no prospect exists of the corporation successfully 
continuing to operate, the corporation will be considered insolvent.
469
 In these instances some 
Delaware courts will apply the ‗balance sheet test‘ in order to determine whether the 
corporations‘ liabilities exceed the reasonable market value of its assets.470 Other courts have 
applied a narrower version of the test by looking at whether a company has a ‗deficiency of 
assets below liabilities with no reasonable prospect that the business can be successfully 
continued in the face thereof‘.471 Research has illustrated that the traditional balance sheet 
test, which is the broader version of the test, is the preferred test used by Delaware courts.
472
 
3.5.2 Defining the Term ‘Zone of Insolvency’ 
Another common term which will be mentioned later in this chapter is ‗zone of insolvency‘. 
When a corporation is said to be in the zone of insolvency it means that there is uncertainty as 
to whether the corporation is experiencing financial difficulties or not.
473
 There is thus no 
certainty as to whether the corporation can be declared insolvent as it moves back and forth 
between solvency and insolvency and this continues for quite some time thereby resulting in 
uncertainty.
474
 Courts have accepted that in instances where corporations‘ financial conditions 
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are deteriorating such as having minimal cash reserves, only having a marginal surplus, 
increasing debt and the inability to invest in future operations, a corporation might be deemed 
to be in the zone of insolvency‘.475  For instance, in the In re Healthco  International, Inc 
case, the court was of the opinion that a company is in the zone of insolvency if the company 
has ‗unreasonably small capital‘ which  indicates financial weakness and makes the 
occurrence of insolvency reasonably foreseeable.
476
 This may take place when a board of 
directors approves a transaction which causes the company to have insufficient funds.
477
 
Having considered the aforementioned essential terms, it is necessary to consider whether a 
corporation being insolvent or operating in the zone of insolvency, has any impact on the 
directors‘ fiduciary duties. The fiduciary duties will not be discussed in too much detail as this 
has been done in chapter 2 but the most important aspects of the duties as it pertains to 
insolvency and zone of insolvency will be focused on.  
3.6 DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES DURING INSOLVENCY OR NEAR 
INSOLVENCY 
As previously noted, directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and in turn the 
stockholders ultimately benefit. As discussed in chapter 2, directors‘ duties consist of the duty 
of loyalty, duty of care and the duty to act in good faith.
478
 Initially the duty of good faith was 
considered in conjunction with the duties of loyalty and care as they are interrelated.
479
 
However, the Delaware Supreme Court in Cede & Co. Technicolor Inc made the duty of good 
faith a separate fiduciary duty thereby creating a triad of fiduciary duties.
480
 When a 
corporation is insolvent or in the zone of insolvency, the directors are still expected to act in 
accordance with their fiduciary duties.
481
 Directors of financially distressed corporations are 
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often faced with complicated and high pressure decisions in fulfilling their fiduciary duties.
482
 
These directors often take big risks by entering into questionable deals which could save the 
corporation but also carries a high risk of failure.
483
Although they face complicated and high 
pressure decisions, which could in turn have a huge impact on whether the company could 
either move away from the zone of insolvency or move out of insolvency, directors are still 
required to exercise their fiduciary duties in the same manner as they would have exercised it 
if the corporation was solvent.
484
 
Therefore, just to touch on the duties which were discussed in detail in chapter 2, it is 
important to note that when a director exercises his duty of loyalty he is required to avoid 
conflict of interest between the director‘s interests and the interests of the corporation.485 The 
duty of care, on the other hand, requires the director to inform himself of all material 
information reasonably available to him before making a business decision.
486
 Not only 
should the director be loyal or act with care, he is also expected to act in good faith thereby 
ensuring that he acts in a manner that will be in the best interests of the corporation.
487
 For 
some time, courts have been grappling with who the fiduciary duties are owed to and there 
have been competing views, some finding that the duties shift from the corporation and 
shareholders to the creditors whilst others have held that directors continue owing their duties 
to the corporation.
488
 
It should be borne in mind that this does not mean that directors owe their fiduciary duties to 
the creditors although the creditors can bring a derivative claim against the director for 
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breaching a fiduciary duty.
489
 The directors continue owing their duties to the corporation, 
however, instead of it being for the benefit of the shareholders the focus shifts to benefiting 
the creditors.
490
 The court in Gheewalla held that ‗when a corporation is insolvent its creditors 
take the position of the shareholders as the residual beneficiaries of any increase in value‘.491 
Something similar was stated in the Quadrant Structured Prods. Co case, when the court 
observed that even when a company is insolvent;  
‗directors are free to pursue value maximising strategies, while recognising that 
the firm‘s creditors have become the residual claimants and the advancement of 
their best interests has become the firm‘s principal objective‘.492 
As illustrated above, it is clear that if the corporation is insolvent, the directors are expected to 
maximise the value of the corporation for the creditors‘ benefit but the question arises as to 
whether the same applies when a corporation is in the zone of insolvency. There have been 
contrasting views regarding the aforementioned as some courts were of the opinion that when 
a corporation is operating in the zone of insolvency, directors owe their duties to both the 
shareholders and the creditors.
493
  Bankruptcy courts agreed with this view thereby supporting 
creditor fiduciary claims where the corporation is operating in the zone of insolvency.
494
 
However, when the concept of ‗zone of insolvency‘ began expanding it brought about great 
concern.
495
 Vice Chancellor Shrine was of the opinion that the directors already owe their 
fiduciary duties to the shareholders.
496
 While being in the zone of insolvency, directors are 
being expected to exercise their fiduciary duties in favour of two different stakeholders, 
namely, the creditors and shareholders.
497
 The issue here is that shareholders and creditors 
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have disparate interests.
498
 Shareholders are interested in the success and well-being of the 
corporation as this would ultimately benefit them whereas creditors are more concerned with 
receiving the money owed to them.
499
 
Although the Delaware courts have agreed that when a corporation is insolvent the directors 
are expected to exercise their duties for the benefit of the shareholders as well as the creditors, 
this view differs when a corporation is operating in the zone of insolvency. Delaware courts 
have disagreed with the view that when a company is merely operating in the zone of 
insolvency but has not been declared insolvent, the directors owe their duties to the 
creditors.
500
 The court in Gheewalla provided that: 
‗If a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, the focus for 
Delaware directors does not change: directors must continue to discharge their 
fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their 
business judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its 
shareholder owners.‘501 
Recently, the Delaware court addressed the aforementioned issue again in an attempt to 
provide clarity on the situation. In Quadrant Structured Products Company the court makes it 
clear that although the creditors are in a position to take derivative action against the directors 
when the company is in the zone of insolvency, no shift of fiduciary duties from the company 
to the creditors take place.
502
 This means that by no means do the directors begin owing their 
duties to the creditors merely because the company is possibly on the brink of insolvency.
503
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3.7 LIABILITY OF DELAWARE DIRECTORS 
As mentioned previously in this chapter, directors of insolvent corporations and corporations 
moving towards insolvency are faced with making high risk business decisions which have a 
high failure rate.
504
 It is thus necessary to consider the actions taken against directors of 
corporations operating in the vicinity of insolvency and insolvent corporations. In doing so, 
this section of the dissertation will indicate the type of action to be taken for the breach of 
fiduciary duties as well as who can institute the action. Prior to discussing the BJR it is 
important to have an understanding of why and how directors of insolvent and near insolvent 
corporations can be held liable.  
As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, there is a difference regarding who can institute a 
derivative action. This difference occurs when a corporation is insolvent and when it is 
operating in the vicinity of insolvency. Therefore, prior to discussing this issue, it is necessary 
to go back to the brief discussion provided on derivative action in chapter 2. For purposes of 
having a better understanding the important aspects of derivative action will be highlighted in 
this chapter.  
Derivative action is instituted on behalf of the corporation, in order to hold directors 
personally liable for harm suffered by the corporation as a result of their failure to fulfil 
certain fiduciary duties. It is generally accepted that a shareholder may sue on behalf of the 
corporation but certain circumstances will warrant the institution of derivative action by the 
creditors of the corporation.
505
 The discussion below will clearly indicate when shareholders 
and creditors have the right to take derivative action.  
The aim of the derivative action is to redress harm suffered by the corporation as a result of 
the directors‘ business decision.506 In doing so, the interests of the corporation are being 
protected as the claim is being instituted for the benefit of the corporation.
507
 Furthermore, in 
instances where the claim is successful and the court requires the defendant directors to pay 
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compensation, the compensation received goes to the corporation and not the stockholders 
who instituted the claim.
508
 
3.7.1 Instituting a Derivative Action when a Corporation is in the Zone of Insolvency 
It was noted that when a corporation is operating in the zone of insolvency, no shift occurs as 
far as fiduciary duties are concerned.
509
 As a result thereof, directors continue owing their 
duties to the corporation at the benefit of the shareholders.
510
 Therefore, when directors have 
breached their fiduciary duties in these instances, only the shareholders are allowed to bring 
derivative actions against the directors.
511
 Delaware law prohibits the creditors from taking 
action against the directors as the corporation is still technically solvent.
512
 It should further be 
noted that a shareholder cannot bring an action in an individual capacity in order to claim on 
behalf of the corporation regardless if the shareholder substantially owns all the corporations‘ 
stock.
513
 The aforementioned makes it clear that Delaware courts have accepted that when a 
corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, shareholders retain the right to institute 
derivative claims. A change however, comes about when a corporation has been declared 
insolvent.  
3.7.2 Instituting a Derivative Action when a Corporation is Insolvent 
When a corporation is insolvent a slight change takes place as far as derivative actions are 
concerned. As discussed earlier in this chapter, in these instances creditors are given the right 
to institute derivative action.
514
 One core factor to pay attention to is that in no way does this 
mean that the shareholders lose their right to bring a derivative claim against the directors.
515
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Insolvency only expands the pool of potential plaintiffs to include both shareholders and 
creditors.
516
 Although both shareholders and creditors can claim, the court in Quadrant with 
reference to Gheewalla stipulated that creditors fall within a principal class injured by any 
breaches of fiduciary duties.
517
 Therefore, shareholders can only benefit from increases in the 
corporations value once the creditors‘ claims have been satisfied.518 Like shareholders, 
creditors are not entitled to bring direct claims against the directors for breach of fiduciary 
duties, as Delaware courts have rejected this view.
519
 When shareholders institute derivative 
claims, Delaware courts have made it clear that what matters is that the corporation is 
insolvent when the claim is instituted.
520
 Therefore, should the corporation regain solvency 
after a derivative action has commenced, it will not affect the creditors‘ claims.521 
Having discussed director liability, it is necessary to consider whether directors are entitled to 
rely on the protection of the BJR when a corporation is insolvent or operating in the vicinity 
of insolvency. The Delaware Chancery Court has repeatedly held that directors of an 
insolvent corporation should participate in business activities provided that they believe that it 
will be in the best interest of the corporation, even though they may have an increased risk of 
failure.
522
 It is for this very reason that directors of insolvent corporations or corporations near 
insolvency should be protected from incurring personal liability.
523
 The next section of this 
chapter will deal with the application of the BJR to protect the directors of both insolvent 
corporations as well as those operating within the zone of insolvency.  
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3.8 THE APPLICATION OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
Initially, it was uncertain as to whether the BJR would protect directors of insolvent and near 
insolvent corporations.
524
 Some courts have suggested that a higher level of judicial scrutiny 
is necessary in these instances.
525
 Directors were thus required to proceed on the assumption 
that the rule would not apply and that they would have to defend their actions under the 
stricter, EFD.
526
 In order to provide clarity on this situation, this section of the dissertation 
will first look at the application of the BJR to directors of corporations operating in the 
vicinity of insolvency. Thereafter, the application of the BJR to directors of insolvent 
corporations will be analysed with specific reference to the Quadrant case as it had a huge 
impact on directors of insolvent corporations.  
3.8.1 The Business Judgment Rule and Directors of Near Insolvent Corporations 
It is important to note that when a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, it 
does not mean that the corporation is insolvent, in actual fact it is most likely still solvent.
527
 
The effect thereof is that the BJR applies in the same manner it would in ordinary situations 
involving a corporation which is clearly solvent. Directors of these corporations are thus 
expected to exercise their fiduciary duties in the best interest of the corporation.
528
 Directors 
will be protected by the rule provided that they acted in good faith, with loyalty and care.
529
 
Although in these instances the application of the BJR appears to be straight forward, there 
are certain additional requirements which need to be satisfied when a corporation is insolvent.  
3.8.2 The Business Judgment Rule and Directors of Insolvent Corporations 
As previously mentioned, there has been uncertainty as to whether the BJR or EFD should 
apply in instances where a corporation is insolvent. The recent Quadrant case has provided 
some clarity on the situation. The discussion below will illustrate when the BJR applies and 
when the EFD applies.  
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The Quadrant case involved a derivative claim instituted by the creditors of an insolvent 
corporation.
530
 The plaintiff creditors argued that the directors had improperly taken on more 
risk to benefit the corporation at the expense of the creditors.
531
 The court observed that 
directors are free to take strategic decisions which maximise the value of the corporation and 
these decisions are generally protected by the BJR.
532
 However, in order to be protected 
directors are expected to justify that their strategies were intended to maximise the value of 
the corporation and when this is established the BJR presumption will apply.
533
 The court was 
of the opinion that Quadrant could not rebut the business judgment presumption by alleging 
that the board has opted for a more risky business strategy to benefit its sole common 
stockholder.
534
 It should however be noted that the BJR will not be applicable in all instances 
of technical insolvency.
535
 The court in Quadrant recognised that not all board decisions that 
appear to increase the value of the corporation in its entirety will be protected by the rule.
536
 
There will be instances in which the liquidation of the corporation will be the method that 
maximises the value of the insolvent corporation.
537
 What differs with the application of the 
BJR in these instances is that even if majority of the board of directors are interested in the 
matter, the court will continue to apply the BJR.
538
 This will only be done provided that the 
directors adopted a strategy which will affect the entire business instead of one which confers 
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a ‗direct or specific benefit to a particular group‘.539 The Court of Chancery has held that there 
are instances when preferential treatment is granted to a particular group which will constitute 
a self-interested transaction thereby removing the protection afforded by the BJR.
540
 
Having observed when the BJR applies, the court went further to observe when the EFD will 
apply. It was held that when a claim pertains to transfers of value from the insolvent 
corporation to the controlling shareholder and its partners, it will be appropriate to apply the 
EFD.
541
 The court opted for the application of the entire fairness as a result of directors 
usually having a conflict of interest when transfers of value take place.
542
 As a result thereof, 
directors are expected to prove that the transfer of value was entirely fair to the corporation 
and its stockholders.
543
 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyses the application of the BJR in various transactions with the focus 
particularly being placed on M&A transactions and insolvent transactions. It illustrates that a 
trend has been set by Delaware courts as they began deviating from the traditional BJR and 
focused on the creation of the modern BJR. This modern BJR consists of heightened 
standards of judicial review which requires courts to shift away from the BJR in order to first 
apply more stringent standards as certain transactions warrant this. In a nutshell, Delaware 
courts have created the EFD, the Unocal standard and the Revlon standard.  The EFD being 
the most onerous of them all is applied in instances where the director‘s loyalty is being 
questioned. The Unocal standard on the other hand is applied in certain hostile takeover cases 
whilst the Revlon standard applies when a sale of control has occurred. The Unocal and 
Revlon standards have only been used as far as certain M&A transactions are concerned and 
there are no cases as of yet, in which the standards have been applied to the transactions 
involving insolvent corporations. Instead, the Delaware courts have continued relying on the 
BJR provided that the strategies adopted by the directors have benefited the corporation as a 
whole. The discussion above has further illustrated that when a transfer of value has taken 
place from the insolvent corporation to certain stockholders, the EFD will be applied.  
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Ultimately, what should be noted from this chapter is that Delaware has not merely stuck to 
the use of the BJR. The courts have realised that sometimes it may be necessary to shift away 
from the initial application of the rule in order to first review the board‘s decision and 
thereafter deciding whether the decision is worthy of the protection of the BJR. The purpose 
of this is to ensure that there is a balance between the interests of the shareholders and that of 
the directors. In certain instances, if the courts were to apply the BJR it might place the 
shareholders in at an unfair disadvantage as directors could possibly be protected when they 
do not deserve the protection.  
Research has shown that many other countries have not followed Delaware‘s trend and have 
chosen to continue applying the traditional BJR. This is of utmost importance to the 
subsequent chapter which will focus on the BJR in South Africa. As a result of the rule being 
relatively new in South Africa, recommendations will be made as to whether the South 
African company law should adopt the EFD, Unocal standard and Revlon standard in specific 
transactions where heightened scrutiny of directors‘ decisions may be warranted.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Since the mid-1990s there has been a debate as to whether the American BJR should be 
incorporated into South African (hereafter referred to as ‗SA‘) law. The debate continued 
until the BJR eventually passed through Canada and landed on South African shore thereby 
forming part of the South African corporate law.
544
 Prior to the incorporation of the New Act, 
South Africa‘s corporate law was governed by the Companies Act 61 of 1973 which did not 
make provision for the BJR.
545
 However, when the New Act was enacted, it changed South 
Africa‘s corporate landscape by developing the roles and duties of directors as well as the 
liabilities associated with it.
546
 Amongst these developments is the BJR which South Africa 
adopted from America.
547
 It should be noted, that although the New Act was enacted in 2008 
it only came into effect in 2011 and as a result thereof, the BJR remains relatively new in 
South Africa and has thus only been considered in one case in 2014.
548
 This raises concerns 
as differences exist between the Delaware BJR and the BJR as it is has been incorporated into 
the New Act. As noted in chapter 2, amongst these differences is the creation of the modern 
BJR by Delaware courts.
549
 This modern BJR consists of enhanced standards of judicial 
scrutiny, such as, the EFD, the Revlon standard and the Unocal standard. These standards are 
adopted in certain transactions such as mergers and acquisitions as well as insolvent trading. 
With the rule being relatively new in South Africa, it remains questionable as to whether the 
SA courts will adopt the aforementioned modern BJR. This chapter will further highlight that 
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although the Delaware BJR contains good faith as a requirement for the BJR, the 2008 Act in 
South Africa, fails to expressly provide for this requirement in section 76(4).
550
 
For purposes of a holistic approach, this chapter will thus examine the historical development 
of the BJR in SA and in doing so the debate surrounding the introduction of the rule into SA 
law will be considered. The chapter will furthermore analyse the directors‘ duties and 
liabilities, the formulation of the South African BJR as provided in section 76(4) of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 as well as the application of the rule to certain transactions, 
namely, mergers and acquisitions and insolvent trading. The differences between the SA rule 
and the Delaware rule will also be considered and essential concerns pertaining to the SA rule 
will be discussed.  
4.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT  
 
In the King Report on Corporate Governance of 1994 (King Report I), the King Committee, a 
Committee established by the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, was of the opinion 
that the Companies Act 61 of 1973 needed to be amended to make provision for a statutory 
limitation on a director‘s duty of care and skill.551 The King Report I, a ground-breaking code 
of corporate governance, was the first of its kind in South Africa and it was aimed at 
promoting the highest standards of corporate governance in South Africa.
552
 The Report 
provides guidelines for the drawing up and implementation of corporate codes of conduct and 
it thus does not contain compulsory rules which companies are required to adhere to.
553
 
In making the recommendation that a statutory limitation should be placed on a directors‘ 
duty of care and skill, the King Committee believed that there was a need to encourage 
entrepreneurship and to attract skilled persons to act as directors.
554
 King Report I 
furthermore recommended that directors should not incur liability for the breach of the duty 
of care and skill provided that they made a business judgment in good faith, the decision they 
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made was an informed and rational decision and the directors had no personal interest in the 
business decision or transaction.
555
 In 2002, King Report II recommended that the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Company Law should conduct an investigation in order to determine 
whether it is desirable to incorporate the BJR into SA law.
556
 The recommendation came 
about as a result of a growing concern that in a new era of corporate governance there would 
be a greater tendency to impose stricter liability on directors for breaching their duties or 
where their conduct has caused the company to suffer harm.
557
 
However, although the King Committee was of the opinion that the incorporation of the BJR 
into SA law should be considered, the committee was not alone in arguing that directors 
should be afforded more protection.
558
 In addition to the King Reports, early case law has 
made it clear that directors should not incur liability for mere error of judgment.
559
 Mere error 
of judgment lacks wrongful intent and as a result thereof, it does not qualify as misconduct.
560
 
In Levin v Felt and Tweeds Ltd, the court held that:  
‗In the absence of any allegations that the directors acted mala fide this amounts 
to asking the court to usurp the functions of the directors and to consider what is 
in the best interest for the company from a business point of view. This is not 
the function of the court of law as the court is not concerned with the 
commercial wisdom of the scheme‘.561 
A similar statement was made by Lord Greene in the case of In re Smith and Fawcett Ltd, 
which provides that, ‗they [the directors] must exercise their discretion bona fide in what they 
consider – not what a court may consider – is in the best interest of the company‘.562 
The essence of the aforementioned statements is abundantly clear, which is that the court will 
not usurp the function of directors by substituting their decisions for the business decisions of 
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directors.
563
 In referring back to chapter 2, one of the reasons why the BJR was created was 
to ensure that courts would not interfere with the business decisions made by directors. It can 
thus be argued that the court in the Levin case provides an implied BJR.
564
 Although there 
had been a clear support for the incorporation of the rule into SA law, some have disagreed 
and were of the opinion that the rule should not be adopted.
565
 The Department of Trade and 
Industry (hereafter referred to as ‗the DTI‘) forms part of the group who did not see a need 
for the rule in SA law.  
Although the DTI did not deem it necessary for the BJR to be introduced into SA law, it did 
however argue that there was a need to make changes to the 1973 Companies Act.
566
 The 
DTI clearly stated that the company law at the time, needed to be altered as the environment 
within which companies were operating had continuously changed since the Companies Act 
of 1973 came into effect.
567
 The Report which was published by the DTI suggested that there 
was a lack of effective mechanisms for the enforcement of directors‘ duties and that the 
duties required clarity.
568
 These duties required clarity because the principles governing the 
directors‘ duties are largely found in case law and the exact content of the duties remain 
subject to various views.
569
 The Report  suggested that the duties of directors‘ be codified in 
legislation in order to create certainty in the law and to ensure that the duties were no longer 
subject to various views of the judiciary.
570
Although the DTI report did not specifically deal 
with the introduction of the BJR into South African law, it recognised that the South African 
society is not litigious in nature and it was thus not necessary to exculpate directors against 
liability for the breach of their duties.
571
 The report consequently implied that the introduction 
of a statutory BJR into South African law would be unnecessary.
572
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Commentators have criticised the above mentioned report for being contradictory because on 
the one hand, the report recommended the introduction of statutory provisions which could be 
relied upon in litigation in order to hold directors liable for misconduct.
573
 However, on the 
other hand it suggests that there is no need for provisions to be enacted which will excuse 
directors from liability for their alleged wrongful conduct.
574
 
4.3 CONTRASTING VIEWS ON THE INTRODUCTION OF THE BJR 
 
There had been much controversy surrounding the introduction of the BJR into South African 
law.
575
 The controversy lingers around the issue as to whether it is a good idea for South 
Africa to follow the BJR formulated in the State of Delaware.
576
 
Those arguing in favour of the BJR were of the opinion that the rule would provide certainty 
to the laws governing directors‘ duties as it will clarify the steps directors ought to take when 
making business decisions, in order to be protected against claims brought against them by 
shareholders.
577
 The BJR will thus create an awareness of the duties owed by company 
directors and it will create a framework within which courts and directors can operate.
578
 The 
rule will simultaneously provide courts with a guideline as to what standard of care is 
expected of directors in order for the BJR to be invoked.
579
 
These proponents further justified their argument by stating that the court is not sufficiently 
equipped to evaluate the decisions made by a director.
580
 In many instances, business 
decisions can be very complex and courts were not made to necessarily understand the 
complex business situations directors may find themselves in.
581
 Therefore, by incorporating 
the BJR into South African law, the courts will be in a better position to apply the existing 
legal principle within a framework of rules and criteria which they are familiar with such as 
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good faith, conflict of interests, reasonableness and rationality.
582
 A further argument is that 
the BJR will strike a balance between the legal expectations of a reasonable person under the 
similar circumstances to that which a director may be in when making a business 
judgment.
583
 The BJR will make provision for a balanced objective-subjective approach as 
this is the desired position that the law needs to strive towards.
584
 Although the rule is usually 
described as objective, it is also largely subjective because the reasonable director is instilled 
with the knowledge and experience of a director whose business decision is in question.
585
 
Although there were various arguments in favour of the codification of the BJR, most 
commentators felt that there was no need to incorporate the rule into legislation.
586
 These 
commentators felt that the Companies Act already provides sufficient protection to honest 
and reasonable company directors and there were barely any cases in which directors were 
sued for negligence.
587
 A further argument is that the BJR is derived from a foreign legal 
system and they are of the opinion that it is undesirable to transplant the aforementioned legal 
doctrine into South African law, as it is based on a completely different legal system.
588
 This 
argument has however been rebutted by proponents of the BJR as they argued that some 
aspects of the BJR have previously appeared in South African case law and the fundamental 
principles of the rule do not significantly differ from South African corporate law.
589
 
Commentators feared that in adopting the BJR, the uncertainty that is currently attached to 
the rule in America, would occur in South Africa.
590
 Proponents of the rule appear to think 
that in instances where there is a breach of the directors‘ duty of care and skill, that the 
directors will immediately face litigation for the breach but this is not true.
591
 The case of 
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Niagara v Langerman & Others is one of the very few reported cases in which a director was 
held liable for breaching the standard of care and skill.
592
 
Although the incorporation of the BJR has been extensively criticised, the BJR was 
incorporated into the 2008 Act. However, it should be noted that although the content of the 
BJR is incorporated into the New Act, the Act does not expressly provide the name of the 
rule. Legislature thus took into account the benefits of the BJR and made a decision to codify 
it in the aforementioned Act.  Having considered the historical development of the BJR as 
well as the pros and cons of codifying the rule it is necessary to consider the purpose of the 
rule, as this coincides with the legislatures‘ decision to codify the rule.  
4.4 PURPOSE OF INTRODUCING THE BJR 
 
Upon drafting the Companies Act of 2008, common law duties were being partially codified 
and the duty of care, skill and diligence, as illustrated below, became more stringent.
593
 The 
New Act thereby increased the liabilities of directors and it was argued that directors‘ 
personal liability would increase dramatically if they fail to calculate and perform their 
business decisions correctly.
594
 The aforementioned statement is supported by the fact that, in 
recent years, directors have been stifled by various burdening legislation, such as the 
Protection of Personal Information Act and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act, which brought about increased possibilities of personal liability for directors.
595
 
Legislature thus acknowledged this and the BJR was introduced into the New Act.
596
 
 
The rationale behind the BJR is to provide directors with relief as it aims to protect directors 
who have made an informed decision without any personal financial interest or alternatively 
disclosed such an interest and rationally believed the decision to be in the best interest of the 
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company.
597
 The BJR thus acknowledges that risks are inherent in business decisions and it 
furthermore assumes that it is unfair to expect that directors will always make perfect 
business decisions.
598
 The BJR therefore encourages the directors to take business decisions 
which are risky as these decisions could ultimately be beneficial to the company.
599
 
A further purpose of the BJR is to promote the objective of the Companies Act of 2008 which 
is described as: 
‗Read as a whole, the 2008 Act promotes the objective that there should not be 
an over-regulation of company business. The Act grants directors the legal 
authority to run companies as they deem fit, provided that they act within the 
legislative framework. In other words, the Act tries to ensure that it is the board 
of directors, duly appointed, who run the business rather than regulators and 
judges, who are never best placed to balance the interests of shareholders, the 
firm and the larger society within the context of running a business‘.600 
In deciphering the aforementioned statement, it could be argued that the purpose of the New 
Act makes it clear that it is the role of the board of directors to manage the company and who 
in essence make business decisions. It goes further by indicating that it is not the role of 
regulators to manage the business by performing important duties such as making business 
decisions. This links back directly to the BJR in that one of the main rationales of the BJR is 
to prevent court interference in business decisions.
601
 
Having considered the history and the purpose of the BJR, it is necessary to consider the 
directors duties which are of particular relevance to the BJR. These duties include the duty to 
act in the best interest of the company, the duty to act in good faith and for proper purpose as 
well as the duty of care, skill and diligence. 
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4.5 DIRECTORS’ DUTIES  
In South Africa, the duties of directors have often been uncertain because it had initially been 
governed by South African common law.
602
 The Companies Act 61 of 1973 followed the 
English law to a large extent and it left most of the law pertaining to directors‘ duties 
uncodified and in doing so the duties were to be developed by courts.
603
 The concern at the 
time was that directors‘ duties were being dealt with inconsistently by the courts of law.604 
The duties imposed on directors are essential to ensuring the success and proper operation of 
a company which is exactly why there had been an urgent need for certainty and consistency 
as far as their duties are concerned.
605
 
As mentioned under the previous section of this chapter, the King Committee called for the 
reform of the South African company law and in 2011 the New Act came into force. The 
New Act partially codifies the common law duties but it should be borne in mind that the 
partial codification of the duties did not render the common law invalid.
606
 The common law 
remains valid but in cases where inconsistency is present, the statutory duties will override 
the common law duties.
607
 It is important to note that the purpose of this section of the 
chapter is not to critically analyse the common law and how it differs from the statutory 
duties. Instead, this section will focus the lens on the current position of the directors‘ duties 
as per the New Act.  The duties which are of particular relevance to the BJR will be analysed, 
namely, the duty to act in the best interests of the company, the duty to act in good faith and 
for proper purpose as well as the duty to act with a degree of care, skill and diligence.  
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4.5.1 The Duty to Act in the Best Interest of the Company 
The common-law principle that a director must act in the best interest of the company is 
codified in s 76(3)(b) of the New Act.
608
 According to s 76(3)(b) a director of a company, 
when acting in his capacity as a director, must exercise the powers and perform the functions 
of director ‗in the best interests of the company‘.609  In essence, when the director participates 
in the management of the company, the duty to act in the best interests of the company 
attaches to the director.
610
 This duty requires a director to act in a manner which he perceives 
to be for the benefit of the company as a whole.
611
 In the case of Visser Sitrus, it was held that 
section 76(4) of the New Act makes it clear that the duty to act in the best interest of the 
company is not an objective duty.
612
 In essence, a director is required to subjectively believe 
that his decision was in the best interest of the company.
613
 
The phrase ‗best interests of the company‘ is an indefinite phrase as different meanings are 
attached to it in different contexts.
614
 The wording implies that the directors are expected to 
act in the best interests of the company and not the shareholders.
615
 However, the general rule 
is that the interests of the company are the interests of the shareholders, as a general body.
616
 
Directors will be in breach of the duty to act in the best interest of the company if they 
exercise their powers in a manner which defeats or harms the interests of their company.
617
 
The duty will furthermore be breached if directors perform their powers in a manner which 
furthers their own interests or the interests of persons other than the shareholders of the 
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company.
618
 In the case of Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd, the court 
highlights the point that the court does not determine what the best interest of the company 
is.
619
 Instead, the test applied by the court is to determine whether a reasonable man would 
have considered the act to be in the best interest of the company.
620
 The court in Treck Corp 
Ltd v Millar further reiterated the aforementioned when the court held that reasonable 
grounds need to exist on which the director in question believed that he was acting in the best 
interest of the company.
621
 In order to determine whether the director complied with the best 
interest fiduciary duty, the court in Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v Lloyd‟s Bank 
formulated a test.
622
 This test requires the court to determine: 
‗whether an intelligent and honest person in the position of the director could 
under the same circumstances have reasonably come to find that he or she was 
in fact acting in the best interest of the company‘.623 
The case of Neptune (Vehicle washing equipment) Ltd v Fitzgerald provides an illustration of 
the aforementioned test.
624
 The court held that the sole director of the company had not acted 
in the best interest of the company by arranging for the company to make generous donations 
to him on the termination of his employment with the company.
625
 The court was of the 
opinion that the director was acting in his own interests and in doing so he breached his duty 
to act in the best interest of the company.
626
 
4.5.2 The Duty to act in good faith and for a proper purpose 
4.5.2.1 Good faith 
The common law principle of good faith has been partially codified in section 76(3)(a) of the 
New Act.
627
 This duty is seen as the principal, overarching duty from which all other duties 
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emerge.
628
 The reason for this is that the duty is always present and it is attached to all other 
fiduciary duties which directors owe to the company.
629
 However, the New Act fails to 
provide a detailed definition of ‗good faith‘ and as a result thereof academics were left to turn 
to court decisions and common law in order to decipher the true meaning of the term.
630
 
In Da Silva and others v C H Chemicals (Pty) the court held that ‗it is a well-established rule 
of common law that directors have a fiduciary duty to exercise their powers in good faith and 
in the best interests of the company‘.631 The duty to act in good faith and in the best interest 
of the company is interrelated.
632
 However, when the New Act linked the duty to act in good 
faith and for proper purpose, the expectation of directors increased.
633
 Thus, it is not enough 
for a director to act according to what he believes to be in the best interest of the company but 
he also has to act for proper purpose.
634
 The common law views the good faith duty as a 
fundamental duty as it is rooted in honesty and it requires that the director apply his mind to 
the decision and thereafter he has to perform his duties in a manner which he honestly 
believes to be in the best interests of the company.
635
 The court in Visser Sitrus further 
stresses the importance of a director acting bona fide which translates to good faith.
636
 
When directors are expected to act in good faith they are required to have reasonable grounds 
for having a specific belief and for acting according to that belief.
637
 In instances where the 
director acted in good faith, the court in Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd makes it clear that courts will 
not review the decision that the directors arrived at in honesty.
638
 Should there be an absence 
of reasonable grounds the courts are likely to be of the opinion that the director lacked good 
faith.
639
 The test to determine whether directors acted in good faith is a subjective test as the 
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focus is on the director‘s state of mind instead of focusing on what it is the court believes to 
have been in good faith.
640
 
4.5.2.2 Proper purpose 
The duty to act for proper purpose is also found in section 76(3)(a) of the New Act and 
although the Act does not define the term ‗proper purpose‘, the common law meaning is 
relied upon.
641
 According to the common law meaning, the duty to act for proper purpose 
requires the directors to ensure that they do not exercise their powers for purposes which it 
was not allocated for.
642
 In essence, directors should not act beyond their powers by acting 
illegally or dishonestly.
643
 An example of this would be a director using the company assets, 
especially the funds, for his own purposes. A further example can be found in the case of S v 
Hepker in which the court held that: 
‗Directors are not allowed knowingly to bind their companies to transactions 
which are unprofitable to the company and are intended to serve the directors‘ 
own ends. That is so even when they all hold the shares and even when all the 
members of the board agree with full knowledge of the facts. The basis of this 
proposition is that the company is a person in law and that directors stand in a 
fiduciary relationship towards it.‘644 
The court in Howard Smith v Ampel Petroleum Ltd held that a director‘s duty to use his 
powers for a proper purpose serves as a test to determine if the director‘s act was for the 
benefit of the company.
645
 In order to determine whether directors have utilised their powers 
for a proper purpose, the court in Extrasure Travel Insurance Ltd v Scattergood identified a 
four-step approach. The court noted that the law pertaining to improper purpose does not 
require evidence that a director was dishonest or that he knew he was trying to achieve an 
alternative purpose.
646
 The court emphasised that when determining whether there had been 
an improper purpose the court will: 
 ‗identify the power being challenged, as well as the proper purpose for which 
the power was given to the director, the substantial purpose for which the power 
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was in fact exercised should be investigated by the court and the court needs to 
decide whether the purpose was proper.‘647 
In the case of Visser Sitrus, the court held that the test for proper purpose is an objective one, 
in the sense that the court has to ascertain whether the actual purpose falls within the purpose 
for which the power was conferred.
648
 The court further highlighted that there is a relationship 
between the requirement that the power should be exercised for proper purpose and the 
requirement that directors should act in what they consider to be in the best interests of the 
company.
649
 
4.5.3 The Duty to Act with Care, Skill and Diligence 
Before commencing the discussion on the duty of care, skill and diligence, it is important to 
note that this duty is not a fiduciary duty.
650
 The purpose behind this duty is to prevent 
directors of the company from acting in a manner that could harm the company.
651
 The 
importance between the distinction of fiduciary duties and the duty of care, skill and 
diligence lies in the basis of liability.
652
 The liability in respect of the former is not based on 
fault whilst liability for breach of care, skill and diligence is purely based on fault which 
includes intentional or negligent conduct.
653
 In referring back to chapter 2 it is evident that 
this differs quite tremendously from the American approach to the duty as it classifies the 
duty as a fiduciary duty.
654
 
For the first time in South Africa‘s corporate law history, the duty to exercise reasonable 
care, skill and diligence has been statutorily defined in s76(3) of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008.
655
 Although section 76(3) makes mention of other duties imposed on directors, 
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paragraph (c) deals specifically with the duty being discussed in this section of the chapter.
656
 
Section 76(3)(c) provides that: 
‗Subject to subsection (4) and (5), a director of a company, when acting in the 
capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director – 
(c) with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may be reasonably expected 
of a person –  
(i)  carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those 
carried out by that director; 
(ii)  having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director.‘657 
The aforementioned provision upgrades the director‘s duty of care and skill as it imposes a 
less subjective and more demanding standard for directors.
658
 This differs from the common 
law version of the duty which is largely subjective and far less stringent.
659
 However, 
although the test is less subjective, it still focuses on the subjective element but included an 
objective element and in doing so, the provision created a two legged test for directors.
660
 
The first leg which is stipulated in subsection (i) is objective as it requires directors to meet a 
threshold in order to avoid liability.
661
 This leg requires courts to consider factors such as the 
size of the company, its nature, and whether the role of the director involves certain 
technical skills.
662
 This was emphasised in the Fisheries Development Corporation SA Ltd v 
Jorgensen case. Margo J held that ‗the extent of a director‘s duty of care and skill depends to 
a considerable degree on the nature of the company‘s business and on any particular 
obligations assumed or assigned to him‘.663 The court will thus consider what would 
ordinarily and reasonably be expected from a director in the aforementioned position.
664
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Subsection (ii) on the other hand, provides the subjective aspect of the test as it focuses on 
the experience of the particular director in question.
665
 However, should the director have 
more skills and qualifications than expected for his position, he will be held to a higher 
standard.
666
 The cumulative effect of the two elements is that it creates a minimum standard 
which directors must adhere to irrespective of their particular skills, knowledge and 
experience.
667
 
A notable difference between the common law and statutory versions of the duty is the 
inclusion of the term ‗diligence‘ when the duty became partially codified.668 This thus raises 
questions as to whether it caused any tremendous change to the duty. It is however, 
important to note that the term ‗diligence‘ relates quite close to the term ‗due diligence‘ 
which is used frequently amongst attorneys.
669
 For example, when attorneys are going to do 
due diligence on a company, it means that they are going to conduct research on the 
company by meeting with the employees and management in order to assess the company, 
its operations and finances.
670
 Similarly, if one were to apply this term in the context of 
directors, it simply means that directors are required to thoroughly investigate the 
implications of their decisions, prior to making a final decision which could impact the 
company.
671
 
South Africa was largely influenced by Australia with the duty of care, skill and diligence. 
Australia included the statutory duty of diligence long before South Africa did.
672
 South 
African commentators and courts barely refer to the term diligence despite it being included 
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in section 76(3)(c) of the New Act.
673
 There is little doubt that the diligence aspect of the 
rule has been derived from the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 and as a result thereof, 
section 76(3)(c) of the New Act is viewed from the perspective of Australian law.
674
 It is 
important to note that care and diligence should be seen as a term rather than trying to 
distinguish between the terms.
675
 When directors exercise diligence they ensure that they 
become sufficiently informed about the situation at hand prior to taking action and in doing 
so they can be in compliance with the duty of care, provided that the manner in which they 
became informed is the same as the manner in which a reasonable person would have 
become informed.
676
 It could be assumed that diligence was added to the duty of care and 
skill to ensure that directors act diligently. The aforementioned statement can be supported 
by the judgment of the Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen case.
677
 
The court was of the opinion that a director is ‗entitled to accept and rely on the judgment, 
information and advice of the management, unless there are proper reasons for querying 
such‘.678 The court further indicated that a director exercising reasonable care would not 
accept information and advice blindly but in instances where he accepts it he should give it 
due consideration and exercise his own judgment in light of the information received.
679
 
Having considered the essential duties imposed upon directors, it is necessary to analyse the 
potential liability faced by directors for the breach of their fiduciary duties as well as the 
duty of care, skill and diligence. In discussing their liability, it will become easier to 
understand why some commentators were of the opinion that the BJR should be introduced 
into SA corporate law. 
 
4.6 DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY 
 
The personal liability of directors became an important issue and it gained momentum when 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 was drafted.
680
 Directors became aware of the fact that they 
were going to become more vulnerable and as a result thereof, they became concerned that it 
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would be easier for them to incur personal liability.
681
 Section 77 of the New Act is quite a 
lengthy provision which focuses solely on the liability of directors.
682
 As a result of section 
77 being as lengthy as it is, this section of the dissertation will not quote section 77 in its 
entirety. Instead it will provide a broad outline pertaining to the important aspects in the 
section.   
According to section 77 of the New Act, a company may recover losses, damages or costs 
which the company sustained as a result of the directors‘ actions.683 This can be done by the 
company in terms of the common law principles which relates to the breach of fiduciary 
duties as well as the law of delict when it comes to the breach of the duty of care, skill and 
diligence.
684
 Therefore, should the director breach any one or more of his fiduciary duties or 
the duty of care, skill and diligence as provided for in the New Act and the common law, he 
can be held personally liable.
685
 Common law is stated because it still remains relevant as 
the provisions in the New Act do not override the common law duties.
686
 Furthermore, if a 
director acted without the required authority, for example by signing documents he was not 
entitled to sign and the company is harmed, the director can incur personal liability.
687
 
Section 77 further provides that if a director is involved in an act or omission with the 
purpose of defrauding a creditor, shareholder or employee, he can incur personal liability 
regardless as to whether he had knowledge that the purpose of the act or omission was to 
defraud one of the aforesaid parties.
688
 Moreover, if a director failed to comply with the 
provisions of the New Act or signed, authorised or consented to the publication of 
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misleading, false or untrue information, the company can institute a claim against the 
director(s).
689
 
The above mentioned instances in which directors can incur personal liability are not 
exhaustive of the provisions in section 77 of the New Act. As mentioned previously, this 
section of the dissertation would focus on providing a broad outline on the liability of 
directors. What is important to note is that in comparing the New Act to the 1973 Act, it is 
very clear that in partially codifying the fiduciary duties, the duty of care, skill and diligence 
of the directors as well as the potential liability they can incur, the New Act became more 
specific thereby arguably, making it easier for directors to incur personal liability.
690
 
It is important to bear in mind that prior to the introduction of the BJR the only protection 
afforded to the directors was indemnification and insurance.
691
 As far as indemnity is 
concerned, a company can indemnify a director from any liability including liability arising 
from his negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust.
692
 However, in order for this 
indemnification to be valid, the company must have taken out insurance and this insurance 
must have been kept as indemnification against any liability as stated above.
693
 
The aforementioned makes it rather clear that directors were in need of more protection, as 
argued by some commentators, hence the introduction of the BJR into South African 
corporate law. The subsequent section will analyse the rule and its formulation as provided 
in section 76(4) of the Companies Act.  
 
4.7 THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
 
As previously mentioned the BJR has been taken from America and incorporated into the 
South African company law.
694
 The BJR specifically covers the duty to act in the best 
interest of the company and the duty to act with care, skill and diligence which is contained 
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in the requirements provided in section 76(4) of the New Act.
695
 What stands out is the fact 
that it does not specifically deal with good faith as this is the most fundamental fiduciary 
duty.
696
 This aspect will be elaborated on later in this chapter.  
The case of Visser Sitrus is the first South African case to make reference to the business 
judgment rule.
697
 The court stated that ‗a court should be wary of substituting its own 
judgment for that of the persons entrusted with that decision by the corporate 
constitution‘.698 This statement serves as an indication of the BJR as it is one of the essential 
purposes of the rule. The court furthermore made mentioned of section 76(4) of the New Act 
which makes provision for the BJR.
699
 Although the court refers to the rule, it does not 
explain all the requirements of the rule and as a result thereof, there is still uncertainty 
pertaining to how courts will, in future, interpret each requirement.
700
 The courts might opt 
for the meanings provided by various academics and foreign case law.   
The rule was codified in section 76(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.
701
 In stipulating the 
rule in the section, it also provides the requirements which directors are expected to satisfy 
prior to receiving the protection of the BJR. According to section 74(6)(a): 
‗(4)  In respect of any particular matter arising in the exercise of the powers or the  
performance of the functions of director, a particular director of a company- 
 
(a) will have satisfied the obligations of subsection (3) (b) and (c) if- 
 
(i)  the director has taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed about the 
matter; 
 
(ii) either- 
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(aa) the director had no material personal financial interest in the subject matter of 
the decision, and had no reasonable basis to know that any related person had 
a personal financial interest in the matter; or 
 
(bb) the director complied with the requirements of section 75 with  
respect to any interest contemplated in subparagraph (aa); and 
 
(iii)  the director made a decision, or supported the decision of a committee  
or the board, with regard to that matter, and the director had a rational basis for 
believing, and did believe, that the decision was in the best interests of the 
company;‘702 
The most essential aspect to pay attention to in the aforementioned section is the cross-
reference to section 76(3)(b)-(c). This serves as an indication that the BJR only applies to the 
statutory duty of care as well as the statutory duty to act in the best interest of the 
company.
703
 When reading the section in its entirety it is clear that a director will have 
satisfied his duty of care if he complied with the three requirements provided for in 
subsection (a)(i)-(iii).
704
 This means that if the director made an informed decision, has no 
personal financial interest in the matter or made full and proper disclosure of his financial 
interest and has a rational basis for believing that the decision was in the best interest of the 
company, the court will presume that he acted in accordance with his duty of care.
705
 These 
are the three fundamental requirements of the rule which directors are expected to satisfy in 
order to be protected by the rule.
706
 It is necessary to consider each of the three requirements 
in detail in order to grasp a better understanding as to what is expected of directors in South 
Africa, in order to be afforded the protection of the rule. 
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4.7.1 Informed Decision 
It should be noted that the New Act does not define the phrase ‗reasonably diligent steps to 
become informed about the matter‘.707 However, it has been noted by various academics that 
directors will be in compliance with this element if they ensure that they have taken the 
necessary steps to inform themselves about the affairs of the company, including other 
details which are essential to the decision being taken.
708
 Directors are therefore expected to 
use various techniques, methods and concepts in order to become informed about the 
matter.
709
 These different techniques, methods and concepts consist of ensuring that they 
(directors) are self-informed, mutually informed, informed by auxiliary bodies, and 
obtaining information from the chairman of the board of directors as well as obtaining the 
opinion of experts such as accountants.
710
 Directors should therefore actively find 
information regarding the matter rather than being ignorant.
711
  What should be noted is that 
the question of how much and what type of information is sufficient to satisfy this 
requirement is determined by directors rather than by the judgment of the court.
712
 
4.7.2 No personal material financial interest 
This element requires the director not to have a ‗material personal financial interest‘ in the 
subject matter of the decision. Section 1 of the New Act defines ‗a personal financial 
interest‘ as a ‗direct material interest of that person, of a financial, monetary, or economic 
nature, or to which a monetary value can be attributed‘.713 This definition makes it clear that 
a director‘s interest must be a ‗direct‘ material interest and not an indirect one.714 It can be 
deduced that this means that the interest should not be a trivial interest which will not impact 
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the outcome of the matter or business decision.
715
  It is essential to note that the interest must 
not only be direct but it should also be material. Section 1 furthermore defines the term 
material by stating that: 
‗material when used as an adjective, means significant in the particular 
circumstances to a degree that is –  
(a) of consequence in determining the matter; or 
 
(b) might reasonably affect a person‘s judgment or decision-making in the 
matter.‘716 
Therefore, in instances where a director has a personal financial interest or a person related 
to the director has such an interest, the director is expected to disclose this interest to the rest 
of the board in accordance with section 75(5) of the New Act.
717
 It should however be borne 
in mind that a director can only disclose the interest of a relative provided that he has 
knowledge of such an interest.
718
 Section 75(5) requires the director to disclose his interest 
and its general nature, as well as any material information pertaining to the matter.
719
 Thus 
all that is required is for the director to disclose the interest held by him or his relative as 
well as its general nature which indicates that the director will not necessarily be expected to 
describe the extent of his interest.
720
 
4.7.3 Rational Basis 
The last requirement provided for in section 74(6) expects directors to have a rational basis 
for believing that the decision would be in the best interest of the company.
721
 The term 
‗rational‘ is however, not defined by the New Act.722 Directors are expected to subjectively 
have believed that their decision was in the best interest of the company and this belief needs 
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to have a rational basis.
723
 In order to understand the last requirement of the BJR, it is 
necessary to clearly understand what is meant by the term ‗rational‘.724 In Visser Sitrus v 
Goede Hoop Sitrus the court noted that the interpretation of the term ‗rational‘ as provided 
in cases pertaining to the exercise of public power, can be used when dealing with section 
76(4)(a) of the New Act.
725
 What this means is that the term rational as it relates to the 
exercise of public power is applicable to the proper exercise of powers by the directors.
726
 
The court in Visser Sitrus held that:  
‗the requirement of rationality has been held to concern the relationship between 
the decision and purpose for which the power was given. Was the decision or the 
means employed rationally related to the purpose for which the power was 
given?‘727 
It is essential to note that when a court deals with the rationality requirement, it cannot 
interfere with the business decision merely because it believes that the power was exercised 
inappropriately.
728
 Further consideration should be given to the case of ASIC v Rich, an 
Australian case which deals with a provision which is the same as section 76(4)(a).
729
 The 
court considered what would satisfy the rational belief requirement of the BJR and it was of 
the opinion that, 
‗if the defendant believed that his or her judgment was in the best interest of the 
corporation, and that belief was supported by a reasoning process sufficient to 
warrant describing it as a rational belief, as defined, whether or not the reasoning 
process is objectively a convincing one‘.730 
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Seeing that courts have accepted that the term rational as far as section 76(4)(a) is concerned 
receives the same meaning as the term as it is used when dealing with public power, 
reference can be made to the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and 
Others.
731
 The court looked at whether the Minister‘s decision was rational and in order to 
determine this, the court had to consider whether the Minister‘s exercise of dismissal power 
related rationally to the purpose of the power.
732
 The court found the decision to be rational 
because there was a rational link between the power exercised by the Minister and the 
purpose of the power.
733
 This case makes it clear that when courts are faced with having to 
determine whether the rationality aspect of the BJR has been satisfied, the court will look at 
whether there is a rational connection between the purpose for which the power was 
conferred upon the directors and the manner in which the powers in question has been 
exercised.  
The essential question which remains is whether the test for rationality is lower or equal to 
that of reasonableness.
734
 It is easy to get confused between the tests and the contrasting 
views concerning the matter do not help.
735
 Some commentators such as J Cassidy are of the 
view that the test for rationality is lower than that of reasonableness.
736
 Commentators such 
as FHI Cassim are of the opinion that the two tests are equal and the exact same.
737
 
However, the supported view appears to be that of the tests being different.
738
 The court in 
the case of ASIC v Rich is of the opinion that if the test of rationality is the same as 
reasonableness, the provisions section 76(4)(a) would be rendered unnecessary.
739
 This view 
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was further supported by the court in Visser Sitrus. The court made it clear that although the 
rationality requirement is objective its threshold is quite easily met in comparison to the 
determination as to whether the decision was objectively in the best interest of the 
company.
740
 The test for rationality does not assess whether the best decision was made or 
whether a different decision could have been made, which are considered when dealing with 
reasonableness.
741
 
Based on the aforementioned requirements, it is clear that directors will be afforded the 
protection of the BJR, provided that they make an informed and reasonable business 
decision which is in the best interest of the company.
742
 The formulation of the rule as 
provided in section 76(4) of the New Act signifies the ‗traditional business judgment rule‘ 
which exists in Delaware law. The rule in this sense is straightforward and will apply 
provided that the requirements mentioned in section 76(4) are met. However, the question 
which comes about pertains to whether South Africa should apply the traditional BJR to 
certain transactions or whether the modern BJR should be adopted. In considering the above 
stated requirements of the BJR it is evident that good faith is not included in section 76(4) as 
a requirement and this is rather concerning. The court in the case of Visser Sitrus 
continuously makes reference to good faith in its judgment.
743
 Throughout the case, the 
court reiterates the fiduciary duty of directors to act in a manner which they bona fide 
believe to be in the best interest of the company.
744
 This makes it questionable as to whether 
it was wise of the legislature to exclude good faith from section 76(4) of the New Act. This 
will however, be addressed later in this chapter.    
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4.8 THE MODERN BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE  
The New Act does not make mention of the modern BJR which was created by Delaware 
courts. The modern BJR, as discussed in chapter 3, consist of the EFD, the Unocal Standard 
and the Revlon Standard. This version of the BJR was adopted by Delaware courts as they 
were of the opinion that shareholders needed more protection against the decisions of 
directors in certain transactions.
745
 However, there is no clarity as to whether South African 
courts will adopt the same approach in certain transactions, namely mergers and acquisitions 
as well as insolvent trading. This part of the chapter will consider the existing protection 
available in the New Act to shareholders in both M&A and insolvent trading transactions. In 
doing so, it will become easier to identify whether South Africa really needs to adopt the 
modern BJR or not.  
As noted in chapter 3, conflict of interest is inherent in M&A transactions and as a result 
thereof, Delaware courts have deviated from the application of the traditional BJR and 
instead applied either one of the EFD, Revlon Standard or the Unocal standard, depending 
on the facts of the case. However, as previously noted, Delaware courts opted for this 
because they felt that shareholders needed more protection.
746
 This then brings the topic to 
the question as to whether shareholders need more protection in South Africa particularly as 
far as M&A transactions are concerned.  
It is rather obvious that the first remedy available to the shareholders in M&A transactions 
would be section 77 which enables shareholders to hold directors liable for the breach of 
fiduciary duties or the duty of care, skill and diligence.
747
 However, section 163 of the New 
Act, furthermore provides that shareholders are entitled to relief from oppressive or 
prejudicial conduct or from the abuse of the separate juristic personality of the company.
748
 
This section protects shareholders in instances where directors exercise their powers in a 
manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or that unfairly disregards the interests of 
the shareholders.
749
 The above stated section also makes reference to section 162 of the New 
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Act as it enables the court to declare a person delinquent or under probation if he or she 
acted contrary to section 163 mentioned above.
750
 This then provides clarity that 
shareholders are also entitled to rely on section 162 of the New Act in M&A transactions. 
Other than the aforementioned applicable remedies, the statutory merger procedure as 
provided in the New Act has inherent protective measures.
751
 The first protective measure 
available is shareholder approval which requires shareholders to approve the merger 
agreement prior to the merger taking place.
752
 This is a vital safeguard for shareholders.
753
 
The second measure is provided in section 164 of the New Act which provides dissenting 
shareholders with appraisal rights thereby enabling them to have their shares bought out by 
the company in cash, at a price reflecting the fair value of the shares.
754
 In doing so, the 
dissenting shareholders opt out of the merger.
755
 The third measure available to shareholders 
is the requirement to obtain the court‘s approval.756 It should be noted that this measure is 
not a general requirement for statutory mergers as it is only required in certain 
circumstances. The court is able to prevent the merger from taking place.
757
 With all the 
protective measures available to shareholders in M&A transactions, it makes it questionable 
as to whether it is necessary to adopt the modern BJR in South Africa. This will be further 
addressed in the subsequent chapter.  
 
Delaware courts made a decision to apply the traditional BJR or alternatively the EFD to 
insolvent trading. In Delaware, directors of insolvent companies can continue to trade and in 
instances where shareholders or creditors allege that directors have breached one or more of 
their fiduciary duties, the directors could rely on the BJR.
758
 This could be difficult to do in 
South Africa as section 22(2) of the New Act enables the Commission to prohibit a company 
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from trading, provided that the Commission has reason to believe that the company is unable 
to pay its debts as they become due and payable.
759
 Section 77(3)(b) of the New Act 
furthermore supports section 22(2) mentioned above, as it allows directors to incur liability 
if they carried on the company‘s business despite knowing that it was being conducted in a 
manner prohibited by section 22(2).
760
 This differs quite dramatically from the Delaware 
approach as companies are still allowed to trade in a manner which could potentially place 
the company in a position in which it can pay its debts as they become due.  
 
Furthermore, section 162(5)(c)(iv) deals with the delinquency and probation of directors. In 
essence what it provides is that directors can be declared delinquent or placed on probation 
if the acted in a manner that amounted to gross negligence, wilful misconduct and breach of 
trust whilst performing their functions and duties as directors.
761
 In considering this in 
relation to section 22(2) of the New Act, it is evident that if the director continued the 
operations of the company recklessly, with gross negligence or with the intent to defraud 
any person, it is highly likely that the director will be declared delinquent or alternatively be 
placed on probation depending on the grounds present in the case before the court.
762
 The 
grounds will determine whether the court will deem delinquency or probation suitable for 
the matter at hand.
763
 For purposes of clarity, when a director is declared delinquent it means 
that he is disqualified from being a director and this disqualification could subsist for 7 years 
or more or it could last a lifetime.
764
 The probation order on the other hand, prohibits the 
person from serving as a director but this can be subject to certain conditions provided in the 
order.
765
 
 
The aforementioned makes it clear that as far as insolvent trading is concerned, sections 
22(2), 77(3)(b) as well as (162(5)(c)(iv) of the New Act, provides shareholders with 
sufficient protection in that they have various avenues with which they can hold directors 
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liable. As a result thereof, it is clear that as far as insolvent trading is concerned, it will not 
be necessary to adopt enhanced standards of judicial scrutiny as shareholders are afforded 
sufficient protection by the three sections provided above. 
 
As noted in chapter 3, the term ‗zone of insolvency‘ is commonly used in Delaware as it 
refers to a company moving back and forth between solvency and insolvency.
766
 In these 
instances, the company is under financial distress but is on the brink of insolvency and not 
yet insolvent.
767
 In South Africa, business rescue could be seen as the equivalent to the zone 
of insolvency. The reason for this is that although the company is under financial distress, 
measures are taken in order to rescue the company from becoming insolvent.
768
 The 
difference with business rescue is that once the board of directors determine that the 
company begin business rescue, a practitioner will be appointed in order to oversee the 
company throughout the business rescue proceedings.
769
 Section 137 of the New Act makes 
it clear that directors continue to exercise their functions as directors but this is done subject 
to the authority of the practitioner.
770
 As long as this takes place, section 137(1)(d) provides 
that the directors will be relieved from the duties provided in section 76 as well as certain 
liabilities set out in section 77 of the New Act.
771
 However, what if the board is aware that 
the company is under financial distress yet it fails to rely on business rescue proceedings? It 
would only make sense for directors to continue performing their duties as set out in section 
76 of the New Act in order to ensure that the company is no longer on the brink of 
insolvency. In essence, directors will be entitled to rely on the BJR as they are still expected 
to perform their fiduciary duties in the aforementioned instance and will not be relieved 
from liability as provided in section 137(1)(d).  
 
The following chapter will make recommendations as to how South African courts could 
deal with the aforementioned concerns. However, prior to moving on to chapter 5, it is 
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necessary to consider the differences between the Delaware and South African BJR. In 
doing so, reference will be made to chapter 2 and 3 and important concerns will be 
highlighted. 
 
4.9 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE DELAWARE AND SOUTH AFRICAN 
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
 
It should be noted that the interpretation and application of the BJR has only been briefly 
addressed in one case, namely, the Visser Sitrus case.
772
 However, when South African 
courts begin dealing with the rule in further detail, there is no doubt that they will refer to 
foreign judgments in order to obtain an understanding of the rule and how it should be 
interpreted and applied.
773
 This section of the chapter will consider the main differences 
between the rule in Delaware and the rule in South Africa.  
 
4.9.1 Exclusion of Good Faith  
 
In referring back to chapter 2 of this dissertation, it is clear that the Delaware case law 
formulation of the BJR expressly includes good faith as a requirement to be met in order to 
be protected by the BJR. However, if reference is made to section 76(4) of the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008, it is evident that only three requirements are provided in the section in order 
for directors to receive the protection afforded by the rule.
774
  However, it is important to 
note that section 76(4) of the above stated Act, fails to expressly provide good faith as a 
requirement.
775
  In essence, as stated by academics, the BJR as provided in section 76(4) of 
the New Act, only provides for the duty of care, skill and diligence as well as the duty to act 
in the best interest of the company.
776
 Some might see the exclusion of the duty of good 
faith as a concern as the duty is referred to as the most fundamental duty which directors are 
expected to adhere to whilst others might adopt a contrasting view. Each potential view will 
be discussed below.  
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Although there are several reasons as to why the duty of good faith is desirable, it could be 
argued that there are reasons as to why the legislature did not include the duty as a BJR 
requirement. In referring back to chapter 2, it was stated that bad faith refers to ‗improper 
motives or personal gain as well as arbitrary actions or conscious disregard for the interests of 
the corporation including the rights of stockholders‘.777 Although the statement defines bad 
faith, it is evident that the statement contains an aspect of the duty to act in the best interest of 
the company.
778
 Some commentators could argue that the duty of good faith and the duty to 
act in the best interest of the company are so interrelated, that it is not necessary to expressly 
include good faith as a requirement for the BJR. They could further argue that the expectation 
of directors to act in the best interest of the company can only be satisfied if the directors 
acted in good faith. The common law supports this argument as it furthermore links the duty 
of good faith to the duty to act in the best interest of the company.
779
 
 
On the other hand, commentators could argue that the failure to include good faith as a 
requirement in section 76(4) of the New Act is alarming. In the Visser Sitrus case, which is 
currently the only case addressing the section 76(4), the court continuously highlights the 
importance of good faith in order to be protected by the rule.
780
 The court in Visser Sitrus 
remains adamant on the importance of good faith expected from directors.
781
Among these 
reasons is the failure of duties such as the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, to cover all 
types of improper conduct by directors.
782
 Certain types of misconduct fall outside the sphere 
of the duty of care and the duty of loyalty whilst most types of misconduct fall within the duty 
of good faith.
783
 Furthermore, in certain instances, even if a director acted negligently or was 
interested in a transaction, there are rules which limit the director‘s accountability.784 For 
example if a director has a personal interest in the matter, the New Act provides that if the 
interest is approved by the board, he will not incur liability.
785
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It has thus been argued that the limits applicable to duties such as the duty of care and the 
duty of loyalty should not be applicable to the duty of good faith as this duty plays a 
prominent role and if a director acted in bad faith, his conduct involves a high degree of 
wrongfulness and should not be excused from liability.
786
 Conduct that lacks good faith 
should not be protected by the BJR and should thus not be shielded from judicial review 
merely because it had been approved by the rest of the board.
787
 
 
In Delaware, the focus on good faith has increased as a result of damages as a remedy against 
directors who have acted in bad faith.
788
 Delaware courts have referred to good faith as a 
potential avenue for plaintiffs seeking to take action against directors‘ decisions.789 In other 
words, plaintiffs can institute action based on an allegation that the directors lacked good faith 
when making a business decision.
790
 With the absence of the requirement of good faith in 
section 76(4) of the New Act, although shareholders have an avenue in which they can hold 
directors liable for the breach of fiduciary duties and the duty of care, skill and diligence, 
directors will not be able to rely on the BJR if shareholders allege that the directors have 
breached the duty of good faith.
791
 This is because the BJR only emphasises the duty of care 
and skill as well as the duty to act in the best interest of the company.
792
 Therefore the director 
could have acted in good faith and not be protected by the rule, or alternatively could have 
acted mala fide and still be protected. This is because the failure to include good faith does 
not necessarily require the court to question whether the director acted in good faith when 
applying the BJR. This is the potential risk of the failure to include good faith as a 
requirement to be met by directors in order to be protected by the rule. 
 
Based on the aforementioned, it is evident that there could be contrasting views regarding the 
exclusion of good faith from the BJR as provided in the New Act. This will be touched on in 
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Chapter 5 and recommendations will be made as to what can and should be done regarding 
the exclusion 
 
4.9.2 Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence  
 
A further distinction concerns the duty of care and skill. Based on the previous discussions 
on the said duty in South Africa, it is clear that the duty has become far more stringent ever 
since it has been partially codified in the New Act.
793
 Furthermore, in South Africa, there is 
a clear distinction between a director‘s fiduciary duty and his duty of care and skill.794 On 
the other hand, in America, the distinction between the fiduciary duty and the duty of care 
and skill has been blurred upon the introduction of the BJR.
795
 Therefore, uncertainty exists 
as to whether the duty of care and skill in America, is a fiduciary duty or not.
796
 The 
aforementioned demonstrates that there is a tremendous difference between the American 
law on directors‘ duties and the South African law on directors‘ duties.797 Not only does the 
duty of care in America and South Africa differ in the aforementioned sense, it also differs 
in the sense that the South African duty of care consists of both subjective and objective 
elements whereas the duty in America, specifically Delaware, only consists of objective 
elements.
798
 South Africa‘s duty of care is subjective as it focuses on the skill and 
experience of the director in question.
799
 The objective aspect of the duty provides a 
minimum standard that all directors are expected to meet.
800
 However, in Delaware, the duty 
of care is only objective as it provides a minimum standard that the directors are required to 
satisfy.
801
 This standard, as previously mentioned, enquires whether the director in question 
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acted in the same manner as an ordinarily careful and prudent person in similar 
circumstances.
802
 
 
4.9.3 The Modern Business Judgment Rule 
 
As previously mentioned another difference between the rule in South Africa and in 
Delaware is the failure of South Africa to make provision for the modern BJR which 
consists of heightened judicial scrutiny of business decisions. Included in the modern 
rule are the EFD, the Unocal Standard as well as the Revlon Standard.
803
 These 
standards were adopted when Delaware courts realised that there are certain 
transactions in which it would be insufficient to merely apply the traditional, 
straightforward BJR.
804
  As discussed in chapter 3, these transactions include mergers 
and acquisitions as well as insolvent trading. Mergers and acquisitions in particular 
consist of inherent conflict of interest on behalf of the directors.
805
 Delaware courts 
went further to apply the BJR to insolvent trading. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
there is currently no certainty as to whether South African courts will opt for the 
modern BJR in certain transactions. Chapter 5 will consider whether and why it would 
be a good idea for South African courts to adopt the modern BJR.  
 
4.10 CONCLUSION 
 
The aspects covered in this chapter provide an understanding as to why and how the 
BJR was incorporated into South African law. It has been highlighted that the rule was 
introduced in order to afford directors with more protection in instances where they are 
expected to make risky business decisions which can ultimately be beneficial to the 
company. One of the alarming points highlighted is the fact that the rule is relatively 
new in South Africa and as a result thereof, more courts are yet to apply and interpret 
the BJR. This might be challenging considering the fact that Delaware courts have 
been applying a heightened standard of review in certain transactions, specifically 
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mergers and acquisitions and insolvent trading. At the moment there is no clarity as to 
whether our courts will adopt the same approach in these transactions and whether 
doing so would be possible. A further concern is that the South African formulation of 
the rule fails to include good faith as a requirement to be satisfied in order to be 
protected by the rule. Delaware differs in this sense as good faith is clearly stipulated 
as a requirement.  
There are always contrasting views amongst academics regarding a certain topic and in 
this instance, contrasting views are bound to arise regarding the failure to include 
‗good faith‘ in section 76(4) of the New Act. This chapter highlights the potential 
differing views and chapter 5 will delve deeper into this issue by providing 
recommendations as to whether the aforementioned failure should be remedied and 
how it can be remedied.  
Another important concern is whether South African courts should adopt the modern 
BJR in certain transactions. Certain transactions might necessitate heightened judicial 
review prior to the application of the BJR. In chapter 5, recommendations will be made 
as to whether and why South African courts should or should not adopt the modern 
rule which consists of the EFD, the Unocal Standard and the Revlon Standard. In doing 
so, reference will be made to chapter 3‘s discussion on the role and success of the 
aforementioned standards.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The central focus of this dissertation is the interpretation and application of the BJR in SA 
law, with particular emphasis on its application to certain transactions which consist of 
mergers and acquisitions as well as insolvent trading. An analysis was conducted of the 
Delaware BJR as well as the South African formulation of the rule. This chapter will consist 
of two sections, namely, conclusions and recommendations. The conclusions will be based on 
the overall findings of the dissertation. The recommendations on the other hand will focus on 
three important concerns. Recommendations will be made regarding the interpretation of the 
BJR, the failure of the New Act to include ‗good faith‘ in section 76(4) as well as whether the 
modern BJR should be incorporated into South African law.  
 
5.2 CONCLUSIONS  
 
In Delaware, directors owe a triad of fiduciary duties to the company which consist of the 
duty of good faith, the duty of loyalty and the duty of care and skill. At common law, the duty 
of care and skill is not a fiduciary duty, however, in Delaware the distinction became blurred 
and the duty now falls under fiduciary duties, hence Delaware courts referring to the 
fiduciary duties of directors as a ‗triad of fiduciary duties‘. This differs fundamentally from 
South African law as the duty of care, skill and diligence is not a fiduciary duty and the 
distinction is quite clear. In Delaware, the duty of good faith was not a fiduciary duty on its 
own until the courts and academics realised the importance of the duty and as a result thereof, 
it became part of the directors‘ fiduciary duties. Delaware courts found that in instances 
where these duties are breached, directors can incur personal liability but this changed when 
the traditional BJR was introduced. The purpose of the introduction of the BJR in Delaware 
was to promote risk taking, to ensure that competent directors are appointed, to prevent 
judicial encroachment and promote judicial efficiency and to achieve a compromise between 
the interests of the shareholders and directors.  
 
Unlike the Delaware case law formulation of the BJR, the South African BJR is codified in 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and it is thus relatively new as it only came into effect in 
2011. The BJR has only been addressed by one court in the case of Visser Sitrus and as a 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
result thereof, uncertainty remains as to how other courts will apply and interpret the rule. 
Further questions remain as to whether it is advisable for South African courts to adopt the 
modern BJR in certain merger and acquisition transactions, as mentioned above. The purpose 
of the introduction of the BJR is relatively the same as the Delaware purposes mentioned 
above. However, in South Africa, it was furthermore introduced to give effect to the 
objectives of the New Act. The Delaware and South African duties of directors are essentially 
the same however, they are phrased differently. In South Africa, the fiduciary duties consist 
of the duty to act in the best interest of the company, the duty to act in good faith and for 
proper purpose and the non-fiduciary duty is the duty to act with care, skill and diligence. 
Had directors allegedly breached one of the aforementioned duties in terms of common law, 
they could incur personal liability but this changed when the BJR was adopted from America 
and included in the New Act.  
 
Although the author touches on the American BJR the lens is focused on the Delaware case 
law formulation of the rule. The reason for this is that Delaware courts initially relied solely 
on what is referred to as the traditional, straightforward BJR. This however changed when 
Delaware courts began expanding the rule thereby creating what is now referred to as the 
modern BJR and as this is the crux of the dissertation, it was necessary to focus on Delaware. 
It is for this very reason that the dissertation focuses on the Delaware case law formulation of 
the rule instead of the American Law Institute version. In deviating from the traditional BJR 
to the modern BJR, Delaware courts essentially deviated from the abstention doctrine 
approach of the rule to a standard of review approach. The reason for this is that Delaware 
courts felt that in certain transactions, judicial interference is necessary prior to the 
application of the traditional BJR as shareholders were in need of more protection against the 
actions of directors. These transactions consist of mergers and acquisitions, particularly 
hostile takeovers and sale of control transactions as well as insolvent trading.  
 
The modern BJR adopted by Delaware courts consist of the Entire Fairness Standard, the 
Revlon Standard as well as the Unocal Standard. The purpose of the modern BJR was to have 
more stringent standards in place as it was warranted by the aforementioned transactions. 
There are instances in which the application of the traditional BJR could place shareholders at 
an unfair disadvantage as directors could possibly be protected when they do not deserve the 
protection. Each of the above mentioned standards is applied depending on the facts of the 
case at hand. The author illustrates in chapter 3 that in instances where the directors‘ loyalty 
 
 
 
 
109 
 
is being challenged, the Delaware courts would apply the EFD. If the case concerns a hostile 
takeover, the Unocal standard will find application and in instances where the case deals with 
a sale of control, the courts will apply the Revlon standard. Therefore, as far as mergers and 
acquisitions are concerned, the courts would opt for either one of the aforementioned 
standards which as previously mentioned, depends largely on the facts of the case at hand. 
This means that directors would need to meet certain requirements before the BJR can be 
applied by the court. In South Africa, uncertainty still lingers around the incorporation of the 
modern BJR but recommendations will later be made as to how this could be dealt with. 
 
The research has further indicated that although the aforementioned standards are not applied 
to insolvent trading, instead, Delaware courts have decided to apply the traditional BJR in 
these instances. This is one of the concerns when looking at South African law. The 
difference in South Africa is that there are instances in which directors will be prohibited 
from continuing the business when the corporation is insolvent and cannot pay its debts as 
they become due. In Delaware on the other hand, directors are still entitled to make business 
decisions in instances where a company is unable to pay its debts provided that the aim of 
continuing business operations is to move away from insolvency. In order to rely on the BJR, 
directors need to prove that the business decision was made to benefit the corporation as a 
whole. It should however be borne in mind that directors of insolvent corporations still need 
to prove that they made an informed business decision, in good faith and in the honest belief 
that it would be in the best interest of the company.  
 
The aforementioned requirements of the Delaware BJR clearly indicate that good faith is a 
requirement. Chapter 4 reiterates the failure of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 to include good 
faith as a requirement in section 76(4) which contains the statutory codification of the BJR. In 
South Africa, good faith is the core and overarching duty from which all the other duties flow 
and the Visser Sitrus case emphasises the importance of this duty when directors perform all 
other duties. Much emphasis is placed on the duty in South Africa as it is interrelated with the 
duty to act in the best interest of the company, the duty to act with proper purpose as well as 
the duty to act with care. The author highlights opposing views pertaining to the exclusion of 
good faith. On the one side, commentators could argue that the current requirements in the 
BJR as formulated in section 76(4) of the New Act are sufficiently linked to good faith and as 
a result thereof, it is not necessary to expressly include good faith. On the other hand, there 
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could be a group of commentators that disagree and feel that the absence of good faith is 
rather alarming as it is the most fundamental fiduciary duty in South Africa.  
 
The aforementioned conclusions highlight all the main and important findings in the 
dissertation. It demonstrates that the dissertation focused on both the Delaware and South 
African formulation of the BJR. The author continuously focuses on what Delaware courts 
refer to as the modern BJR as it is questionable as to whether South Africa will follow the 
same approach when dealing with certain business transactions. Further emphasis is placed 
on the failure to include good faith as a requirement in section 76(4) of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008. The next section of this chapter will thus focus on the recommendations pertaining 
to the interpretation of the BJR in SA law, the possible adoption of the modern BJR as well 
as the exclusion of good faith from section 76(4) of the above stated Act. In doing so, 
reference will be made to chapter 3 and 4 which contains arguments pertaining to the above 
concerns, respectively.  
 
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.3.1 Interpretation of the traditional BJR 
 
An important aspect which could attract attention in the near future is the interpretation of the 
term ‗rational‘ in the BJR as provided in section 76(4). There has been a vast amount of 
uncertainty and difficulties regarding the interpretation of this term as a result of the 
contrasting views pertaining to it. These contrasting views have often blurred the difference 
between the term ‗reasonable‘ and ‗rational‘. In some instances, commentators were of the 
view that the reasonable standards are not any different from the rational standards thereby 
implying that the two terms are exactly the same. However, the court in the Visser Sitrus, 
with reference to other cases, provided some clarity on the matter.  
 
As discussed in chapter 4, the Visser Sitrus made it clear that when determining what is 
meant by rational as far as it relates to directors, it is necessary to look at how the term was 
defined in so far as it relates to public power. In doing so, the court found that when speaking 
about rational in the sense of company law, it is clear that the term refers to the link between 
the power exercised by the director and the purposes for which the power was given to the 
director. In instances where there is a sufficient link between the two as provided in the 
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Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others case, the court will find the 
directors‘ decision to have been rational.  
 
Based on the aforementioned, it is advisable that in future, courts make specific reference to 
the Visser Sitrus case when interpreting the rational requirement provided in section 76(4) of 
the New Act. This case provides detailed guidelines as to how a court should determine 
whether a decision was rational or not. However, courts should not restrict themselves to this 
case alone, as they have the freedom to make reference to international cases such as ASIC v 
Rich. This should be done when dealing with the interpretation of the BJR in its entirety. 
Courts should make reference to international cases in order to effectively analyse and 
interpret the BJR. This is confirmed by section 39 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa as well as sections 5 and 7 of the new Companies Act itself.  
 
5.3.2Application of the modern BJR in certain transactions 
 
As previously mentioned South Africa currently only has the traditional BJR codified in the 
New Act as the rule is still relatively new. In referring back to chapter 3 it is evident that 
Delaware courts felt that in certain transactions it would be necessary to take additional 
precautions to balance the interests between the shareholders and directors. Yes, the 
traditional BJR protects directors, but there are certain transactions which require a 
heightened standard of judicial review in order to provide shareholders with more protection. 
In mergers and acquisitions for example, conflict of interest is inherent in those transactions 
and if Delaware courts were to merely apply the traditional BJR, directors could easily escape 
liability. The same could be said for South African directors and M&A transactions. With the 
traditional BJR being so new in South Africa, it would be advisable for SA courts to focus on 
the application and interpretation of this version of the rule prior to considering the modern 
BJR. The reason for the aforementioned is that there is still no certainty as to how SA courts 
will deal with the rule and whether it will be successful in South Africa, especially 
considering the failure to include good faith as a requirement to be protected by the rule. 
Although the Visser Sitrus case has dealt with the BJR, it did not deal with it in sufficient 
detail to create clarity regarding the rule. It is still very possible that courts will encounter 
some problems with applying and interpreting the BJR, especially with having to refer to 
Delaware and other foreign judgments. It could still take years for the courts to resolve the 
uncertainties currently pertaining to the South African BJR but once these uncertainties have 
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been seen to and the success of the rule has been established, courts might begin looking at 
the modern BJR. Each standard, namely, the EFD, the Unocal Standard and the Revlon 
Standard plays an essential role and are effective depending on the circumstances of the case. 
In Delaware, courts have been successful in applying each of the above stated standards and 
it can be argued that this success only occurred upon Delaware courts mastering the 
application of the traditional BJR. This provides even more reason for SA courts to first focus 
on the rule as provided in section 76(4) prior to focusing on a heightened standard of judicial 
review. In the interim, SA courts should apply the traditional version of the rule as provided 
in the New Act, to M&A transactions.  
 
The question which then arises is whether it is actually necessary for South African courts to 
adopt the modern BJR in M&A transactions. Based on the discussion provided in chapter 4 of 
this dissertation, it is evident that there are a number of protective remedies available to 
shareholders in M&A transactions. These remedies include section 77 and 163 of the New 
Act as well as other remedies which are inherent in the statutory M&A process, such as, 
shareholder approval, appraisal rights and court approval. With all these measures in place, it 
is clear that the legislature ensured that shareholders were afforded protection in M&A 
transactions. It could be assumed that the legislature was fully aware of the dangers inherent 
in these transaction hence the provision of the aforementioned remedies. This thus makes it 
questionable as to whether it is actually necessary for the modern BJR to be adopted. For 
example, if the shareholders approve the M&A transactions, with full knowledge of the risks 
involved, it would be unfair to expect a more onerous standard to be placed on the directors 
by relying on enhanced standards of judicial scrutiny. This would unfairly provide 
shareholders with extra protection which in essence could be defeating the purposes of the 
traditional BJR.  
 
A further question revolves around the application of the modern BJR to insolvent trading. 
As mentioned in chapter 4, there are certain instances in which insolvent trading is prohibited 
by the New Act. Again, in order to determine whether it is necessary to adopt enhanced 
judicial scrutiny standards in cases dealing with insolvent trading transactions, it is necessary 
to consider the protection afforded to shareholders in these instances. Although in Delaware, 
directors of insolvent companies are still entitled to trade, the situation is slightly different in 
South Africa. Section 22(2) of the New Act is one of the protective measures available to the 
shareholders and creditors in these instances as it entitles the Commission to prohibit 
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directors from trading when a company is insolvent. A further protective measure provided to 
shareholders is contained in section 77(3)(b) of the New Act which makes provision for 
directors to be held liable if they continued to trade after being prohibited from doing so. 
However, in instances where the Commission does not prohibit trading and the company is 
insolvent, the directors will be in a position to continue trading and in essence, will be 
protected by the BJR. It should be borne in mind that this will only happen in exceptional 
instances in which the Commission fails to pick up that the company is not in a position to 
trade and thus fails to prohibit trading in terms of section 77(3)(b) of the New Act. Lastly, 
section 162(5)(c)(iv) of the New Act, furthermore entitles shareholders to have directors be 
declared delinquent or placed under probation. With these remedies in place protecting 
shareholders, it is evident that all odds are against directors and shareholders are provided 
with sufficient protection in instances which involve insolvent trading. Hence, in order to 
ensure equal protection amongst shareholders and directors, it will not be necessary to adopt 
the modern BJR in cases dealing with insolvent trading. Directors however, should be 
entitled to rely on the traditional BJR without any enhanced standards of judicial scrutiny 
brought about by the modern BJR.  
 
Furthermore, as mentioned in chapter 4, business rescue in South Africa may be seen as the 
equivalent to the zone of insolvency in Delaware. As noted in chapter 4, if directors decided 
to place the company under business rescue and a practitioner is appointed, the directors will 
be relieved from their duties in terms of section 76 and certain liabilities as provided in the 
New Act. Although they are relieved from their duties and certain liabilities, if directors fail 
to perform in the required manner, the practitioner may apply for a court order to remove the 
directors from office. Furthermore, if the directors fail to place the company under business 
rescue proceedings they will be required to continue performing their duties as provided in 
section 76 of the New Act. This means that directors can incur liability and should thus be 
entitled to rely on the BJR. Based on the aforementioned, it is evident that the shareholders 
receive sufficient protection as the New Act provides shareholders with a number of remedies 
should directors fail to perform their duties. Furthermore, directors can be removed from 
office if they fail to act in the required manner. On the other hand, directors also receive 
sufficient protection as they are relieved from liabilities when a practitioner is appointed to 
oversee the business rescue proceedings and they are further protected by the BJR if they do 
not place the business under business rescue, but continue performing their duties in order to 
save the company. As a result of the aforementioned, it is thus not necessary to rely on 
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enhanced standards of judicial scrutiny in these instances as both the shareholders and 
directors are sufficiently protected.  
 
5.3.3 Exclusion of Good Faith 
 
The exclusion of good faith is an issue of great concern and reference will be made to the 
arguments contained in the previous chapter. As mentioned, there are usually contrasting 
views by academics pertaining to a certain issue. In chapter 4 the author provided two 
differing perspectives but the perspective the author is in agreement with is that the failure to 
include good faith in section 76(4) is a concern. With good faith being the most fundamental 
and central fiduciary duty from which all other duties flow, it is only common sense that the 
duty be expressly included in the aforementioned provision. It is nonsensical for a director to 
be protected by the BJR without having acted in good faith.  Although Delaware does not 
necessarily view the duty of good faith as the fundamental fiduciary duty and only later made 
it a separate fiduciary duty, it illustrates that the courts still thought that it is important to 
expressly provide for the rule in the formulation of the BJR. If Delaware included it, it is a 
concern that South Africa failed to include it. The Visser Sitrus case was discussed quite a 
few times in the previous chapter as it is currently an important case in South Africa 
regarding section 76(4) of the New Act. The fact that the court continuously reiterates the 
good faith duty of directors throughout its judgment removes any doubt that good faith plays 
an extremely important role in directors‘ duties and this importance cannot be overlooked. It 
thus makes no sense as to why good faith is not included as a requirement in section 76(4).  
 
One way in which this can be remedied is by the court reading in the term ‗good faith‘ or 
alternatively, legislature can amend the New Act in order to include compliance with the duty 
of  good faith as a requirement for reliance on the BJR in section 76(4).
806
 This amendment is 
essential as the failure to include good faith as a requirement can lead to serious implications 
as directors could escape liability for decisions which, although meet the requirements of the 
BJR, are decisions which lack good faith. A further implication is that although shareholders 
have good faith available as an avenue to hold directors liable, directors could possibly incur 
liability although they acted in good faith as a result of it not being a requirement of the BJR 
                                                          
806
 Mqeke R ‗Legal Theory 2: Legal Interpretation‘ available at 
https://www.ru.ac.za/media/rhodesuniversity/content/law/documents/10-
students/2013courseoutlines/Legal%20Interpretation.pdf (accessed on 23 September 2016).  
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as provided in section 76(4). Alternatively, directors will be protected by the rule although 
they acted mala fide as courts will not be obliged to enquire into whether directors acted in 
good faith in order to be protected by the BJR.  
 
In conclusion, the research conducted in this dissertation brings to light a number of concerns 
and unanswered questions pertaining to the BJR as provided in the New Act. As previously 
stated, the focus of this dissertation is whether the modern BJR should be incorporated into 
South African law. The aforementioned recommendations clearly indicate that it is not 
advisable or necessary for South African courts to adopt the modern BJR in certain 
fundamental transactions, namely, M&A transactions as well as insolvent trading. The main 
reason for this is that directors as well as shareholders receive sufficient protection and the 
New Act creates a balance between the protection provided to shareholders and the protection 
provided to directors. Furthermore, the courts need to focus on the BJR as provided in section 
76(4) of the New Act as it is still relatively new and is yet to be relied upon by a director 
thereby resulting in the current uncertainty. In doing so, the courts will in the foreseeable 
future, be in a position to interpret the BJR as well as provide clarity as to the absence of 
good faith as a requirement of the BJR.  
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